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Technical Assessment Report 
1.0 Notification and Authorization 
Mr. J. Leggett, International Space Station (ISS) Chief Engineer, requested the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) conduct an assessment of the ISS Simplified Aid for 
Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery against post Boeing Company model 787-8 
Dreamliner commercial aircraft lithium (Li) battery failures lessons learned. Specifically, this 
task was focused on assessing the severity of a cell-to-cell propagating thermal runaway (TR) 
event in the SAFER non-rechargeable Li battery power system. 
An out-of-board initial summary for SAFER Battery Assessment was approved on July 24, 2014, 
by the NESC Review Board (NRB). 
The key stakeholders for this assessment are the NESC, the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Power 
and Propulsion Division, the ISS Program, and the ISS Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) Office. 
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4.0 Executive Summary 
In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three 
catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures [1−3]. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell 
thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures 
involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a non-
rechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery 
failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of 
the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li 
non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li non-
rechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure 
lessons learned [4]. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER 
battery TR hazard conditions.  
To meet the assessment objectives, external short and single-cell TR testing was performed 
under relevant worst-case environments utilizing flight hardware configurations. The 
investigation was completed by a team of NASA and industry battery subject matter experts. 
Test management, engineering, and technician expertise was provided by the Johnson Space 
Center Propulsion and Power Division, and Energy Systems Test Area organizations.  
Observations and findings were developed based on test results and analysis obtained from this 
assessment. Observations and findings were used to formulate NESC recommendations 
consistent with NASA and industry Li battery requirements standards, guidelines, and lessons 
learned.  
The entire list of findings, observations and recommendations can be found in Section 8 of this 
report. Key findings, observations and recommendations are summarized below.  
The SAFER battery design propagated single-cell TR to neighboring cells throughout all cells on 
the same side of the centrally located circuit board as the trigger cell such that under ambient 
conditions, a single-cell TR in the 4S bundle side results in cell-to-cell TR propagation to all 12 
cells in that bundle (i.e., Tests #1, #2, and #3) and a single-cell TR in the 10S bundle side results 
in cell-to-cell TR propagation to all 30 cells in that bundle (Test #4). The NESC team concluded 
that SAFER battery capacity gauge board cavity provides sufficient spacing of approximately 
3.5 inches between the 4S-cell and 10S-cell bundles to prevent propagation of TR to the opposite 
side of battery pack. The NESC team recommends the Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) Program 
Office move to redesign this battery using the latest lessons learned in other EVA battery 
redesigns at its earliest convenience. 
In addition to the test-result-based findings, the team reviewed SAFER battery documentation. In 
the SAFER battery hazard report the NESC team found no explicit mention of single-cell TR and 
propagation. The team recommends the report be revised to include this hazard explicitly. Also, 
the team found SAFER flight battery build procedures do not include a process step for cell 
matching and selection and recommends this be included. 
In addition, the NESC team acknowledges the variability in trigger methods even for small cell 
for factors and recommends the technical community undertake a study to develop a standard 
test method for initiating TR. 
And finally, the NESC team recommends the EVA Program assess the impact of the test result 
(i.e. partial single-cell TR propagation) to the operation of the SAFER pack and the EVA crew 
member as that work is considered out of scope for this assessment.  
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5.0 Assessment Plan 
5.1 Background 
In January 2013, two separate Li-Ion rechargeable battery failures occurred on The Boeing 
Company 787-8 (B-787) Dreamliner commercial passenger aircraft. The first (i.e., Japan Airlines 
B-787; JA829J) and second (i.e., All Nippon Airways B-787; JA804A) battery failures 
originated in the aircraft auxiliary power unit and main Li-Ion batteries, respectively. The 
subsequent root cause investigations concluded that both B-787 Li-Ion battery incidents were 
initiated by single-cell TR events, which propagated to adjacent battery cells [1,2]. The severity 
of the resulting propagating cell-to-cell TR events was catastrophic to the B-787 battery function 
and operation.  
In July 2013, a third Li battery failure occurred on an unoccupied B-787-8 Dreamliner aircraft 
(i.e., Ethiopian Airlines B-787; Stand 326) while parked on the ground at London-Heathrow 
airport [3]. The incident was caused by a non-rechargeable Li-MnO2 battery, which served as the 
primary power source for the aircraft Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) radio location 
device. The resulting incident investigation concluded the failure of the ELT non-rechargeable 
Li-MnO2 battery, “…most likely resulted from an external short-circuit, in combination with the 
early depletion of a single cell, leading to thermal runaway which propagated to adjacent cells” 
[3].  
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) non-rechargeable Li-MnO2 cells are commonly used in 
various aeronautics, military, and consumer electronics applications. Specifically, it was noted 
the B-787 ELT battery (UltraLife™ U10013) and ISS SAFER battery (Duracell® Ultra® CR123) 
utilize similar Li-MnO2 battery technologies. Table 5.0-1 compares selected characteristics of 
these Li-MnO2 cell technologies. 
Table 5.0-1. Selected ISS SAFER (Duracell® Ultra® CR123) and B-787 ELT (Ultralife™ U10013) 
Li-MnO2 Battery Cell Characteristics. 
Cell Characteristic Duracell® Ultra® CR123 Ultralife™ U10013 
Electrical 
Chemistry 
Cathode: MnO2 
Anode: Li 
Cathode: MnO2 
Anode: Li 
Li Content (g) 0.55 3.4 
Nominal Operating Voltage (V) 3.00 3.00 
Capacity (ampere hour (Ah)) 1.50 1 11.1 2 
Thermal 
Nominal Operating Range (C) −20 to +75 −40 to +72 
Mechanical 
Weight (g) 17 115 
Geometry Cylindrical Cylindrical 
Common Name (Size) 2/3A D 
Safety 
Internal Positive Temperature 
Coefficient (PTC) Device 
Yes No 
External Vent Yes Yes 
Notes: 
1. C/30 discharge at room temperature to 1.55 V. 
2. 250 mAh discharge to 2.0 V at 23 C. 
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5.2 Objectives 
As a result of these aeronautics industry Li battery failure incidents, the NESC initiated safety 
assessments of the various ISS Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) Li battery power sources. 
Specifically, the NESC was requested to assess the SAFER battery. The assessment included 
tasks which characterized the safety of the SAFER battery design against the B-787 Dreamliner 
Li battery failure standards and lessons learned [4]. 
The assessment objectives were: 
1. Extend the existing SAFER Li battery test database by performing updated safety tests 
representative of industry experience with similar Li battery power systems. 
2. Conduct credible worst-case SAFER Li battery safety tests designed to quantify the 
severity of a TR condition that may result in cell-to-cell propagation. 
3. Develop technical recommendations based on the test results. 
5.3 Test Approach 
The test approach was to conduct characterization testing broadly defined as any testing whose 
objectives are to further quantify certain performance or safety characteristics. Characterization 
testing was not conducted for the purposes of flight article qualification or certification. Figure 
5.3-1 shows the general test sequence flow diagram. Initial single cell-level characterization 
(Phase I) included a tailored cell acceptance test program per ISS requirements [5]. Phase II 
testing was conducted at the bundle level of cell integration. Test battery bundles were 
configured in either a 4-cell (i.e., 4 cells connected electrically in series, 4S) or 10-cell  
(i.e., 10 cells connected electrically in series, or 10S) architecture with, or without, PTC devices 
and/or Schottky diodes. Finally, Phase III testing was conducted at the SAFER battery-level  
(i.e., three 14-cell bundles electrically connected in parallel). Battery-level test article 
configuration and test environments were developed based on ISS SAFER flight configurations 
and environments. 
5.3.1 External Short Testing 
The objective of this test series was to evaluate if an external short condition would create a TR 
hazard in the SAFER battery. Specifically, the ability of the external PTC device to protect the 
SAFER battery, under selected external short conditions was evaluated. Due to the availability of 
similar Duracell® Ultra® CR123 single-cell external short test data, testing at the single-cell 
external short testing was not performed. However, 4S- and 10S-cell bundle testing in various 
electrical and mechanical configurations was conducted.  
5.3.2 Single-Cell Heater Trigger TR Testing 
The objective of this testing was to characterize the COTS Duracell® Ultra® CR123 SAFER 
battery cell under various heater trigger test conditions. This testing enabled optimization of 
heater power, location, and type for the development of test procedures in support of the 
subsequent SAFER battery TR test phase.  
5.3.3 Battery TR Testing 
The objective of this testing was to quantify severity and evaluate the extent of cell-to-cell 
propagation of TR failure in a single cell. The test approach was to conduct a series of single-cell 
heater trigger tests to determine the voltage, current, and temperature characteristics of a single-
cell TR event. Trial test runs were conducted to optimize the thermocouple placement, heater 
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location (i.e., side or bottom), and heater power. The results of the single-cell heater trigger tests 
were used to support the subsequent SAFER battery TR test phase. 
Test management, engineering, administration, and support personnel, and general safety 
operations, test facilities, and other resources were supplied by the JSC ESTA. 
 
Note: Dotted lines represent test opportunities to repeat certain tests if required. 
Figure 5.3-1. Generalized Test Flow Diagram for SAFER Battery Characterization Testing 
5.4 Assessment Plan 
Key elements of the assessment plan and approach were: 
1. NESC Assessment Team: Organized an assessment team chosen from the NESC 
Electrical Power Technical Discipline Team (TDT). Team members had no direct 
technical, cost, or schedule responsibility for the SAFER battery product under review.  
2. Integrated Concurrent Engineering and Technical Assessment: Implemented a concurrent 
engineering approach for all aspects of the project. As such, the NESC assessment team 
was fully integrated with JSC ESTA personnel. In addition, the team worked 
concurrently with the SAFER subject matter experts in the ISS EVA and Safety & 
Mission Assurance Offices.  
3. Heritage SAFER Battery Data: Utilized existing data and analysis archived in support of 
the heritage SAFER battery program. These data included, but were not limited to: 
product specifications, interface control documents, test plans and procedures, drawings, 
raw data, engineering reports, analysis, and other supporting engineering information.  
4. Test Plans, Procedures, and Data Management: General test requirements were 
developed and documented in test plans, which were updated as required. Test 
procedures were developed from test plans for implementation throughout each test 
phase. Test data including time series data, images, and videos were archived on the 
NASA Safety Center Knowledge Now (NSCKN) data management tool under the 
SAFER battery Community of Practice (CoP).  
5. Test As You Fly Philosophy: Employed engineering ground test articles, which were the 
best possible form, fit, and function of flight ISS SAFER cell and battery products. 
Utilized flight test specifications and procedures as required. Flight-like environments 
were analyzed and integrated into the test procedures and facilities.  
6. Industry Lessons Learned: Incorporated industry lessons learned and knowledge gained 
from NASA Li-Ion cell and battery heater TR trigger testing activities [6−9]. A special 
emphasis on heater trigger testing protocols was emphasized. 
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6.0 System Description and Technical Risk Considerations 
6.1 SAFER System Description 
First flown in 1994 on Space Transportation System (STS)-64, the ISS SAFER is a self-
contained, 24-jet free flyer that provides adequate propellant and control capability to allow an 
EVA crewmember separated from the ISS to perform a self-rescue back to the station (Figure 
6.1-1). The integrated SAFER is worn when a United State of America (USA) astronaut 
conducts an EVA.  
 
a)     b) 
Figure 6.1-1. a) ISS SAFER System Unit and b) USA Astronaut on EVA with  
SAFER Attached to EMU 
The SAFER consists of main unit, tower latches, hinges, avionics unit, and three hardware 
modules: propulsion, hand controller module (HCM), and intra-vehicular activity (IVA) 
replaceable battery pack [10]. The SAFER fits around the EMU primary life support system 
(PLSS) without limiting suit mobility (Figure 6.1-2). Control is provided through crewmember 
inputs from a single HCM. The HCM is stowed in a cavity on the right side of the SAFER 
propulsion module when not in use, and activated when needed. To deploy the HCM, the 
crewmember pulls up on a deployment handle mounted on the front, right side of the propulsion 
module. The crewmember then grabs the HCM from the tray, holds the module in his left hand, 
and turns on the power switch. This switch fires a pyrotechnic device that pressurizes the 
propulsion system. The HCM can then be used to perform self-rescue.  
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Figure 6.1-2. ISS SAFER System Overview 
The SAFER battery assembly is launched unattached and soft stowed in foam with the SAFER 
(Figure 6.1-3). The battery assembly is installed on-orbit to the main unit, underneath the 
propulsion module, with eight captive fasteners. The assembly is designed to be replaceable 
during ground or on-orbit IVA servicing. The assembly connects to a SAFER with one 
cable/electrical. Once on-orbit, the assembly is stored in an ISS pressurized area. 
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Note: SAFER battery assemblies may be stored in the ISS airlock or other pressurized locations. 
Figure 6.1-3. On-orbit SAFER Battery Assemblies in their Stowage Bags 
6.2 SAFER − Battery Description 
The SAFER receives primary electrical power from the battery assembly. The assembly is 
composed of a gauge board, an electrical cable, and 42 non-rechargeable Li cells. These cells are 
the COTS Duracell® Ultra® CR123 Li-MnO2 design used in various commercial high-power 
electronic devices. Table 6.2-1 summarizes the general mechanical, electrical, thermal, and 
safety characteristics of the Duracell® Ultra® CR123 cell design [11,12].  
The batteries provide capacity for the avionics subsystem to perform 52 1-minute on-orbit IVA 
checks, and one EVA self-rescue of 13-minute (minimum) duration, within an operating voltage 
range of 19 to 42 V. To meet these SAFER system voltage and capacity mission requirements, 
the battery cells are electrically connected into a series-parallel (s-p) battery topology. First, the 
SAFER battery contains individual 4- and 10-cell “bundles” with their cells connected 
electrically in series (Figure 6.2-1). Cells are connected by nickel tabs spot-welded to the cell 
terminals. Each cell bundle contains a SRP-200F resettable PTC thermal fuse and a dedicated 
Schottky diode. Individual 4S- and 10S-cell bundles are connected electrically in series to form a 
14-cell series string [13]. Finally, three 14-cell series strings are electrically connected in parallel 
to form a 14s-3p battery architecture.  
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Table 6.2-1. Selected Design, Electrical, and Safety Performance Characteristics of the Duracell® 
Ultra® CR123 Cell Design 
 
Figure 6.2-1. Electrical Schematic of 4- and 10-cell Bundles [13] 
Cell Characteristic Duracell® Ultra® CR123 
Electrical 
Chemistry 
Cathode: MnO2 
Anode: Li 
Li Content (g) 0.55 
Nominal Operating Voltage (V) 3.00 
Nominal Internal Impedance (ohm @1kHz) 0.25 
Capacity (C/30 mAh discharge at room 
temperature to 1.55 V) 
1500 
Thermal 
Nominal Operating Range (C) −20 to +75 
Mechanical 
Terminal Design Flat, Recessed Negative Terminal, Nickel Plated Steel  
Dimension (height × depth, mm) 34.5 × 17.0 (with terminal) 
Average Weight (g) 17 
Safety 
Internal PTC Device Yes 
External Vent Yes 
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Battery cell bundles and gauge board are packaged in an aluminum metal case lined with foam. 
The aluminum metal case consists of a 6061-T6 cover and a 7075-T7351 lower housing. The 
cover and housing are coated with white A276 Chemglaze® paint. Stainless steel fasteners and 
inserts are used to assemble and close the case. The cell bundles are cushioned in the case with 
polyimide foam faced with Kapton® tape. A Vespel® SP-1 circuit board cover and a cellulose 
acetate butyrate insert are used to secure the gauge board in the case.  
The battery gauge board is a printed wiring board assembly based on a Microchip Technology 
Inc. MTA11200B chip. The MTA chip with integrated circuit (IC) calculates battery voltage, 
temperature, and remaining battery capacity. The battery capacity gauge IC is continuously 
powered to measure battery capacity during storage, and when connected to the SAFER. An 
integrated harness cable assembly utilizes an RS232 communication link to communicate with 
the SAFER avionics subsystem.  
The SAFER battery assembly is an orbital replacement unit (ORU) with a 3.5-year service life. 
Selected electrical, thermal, and mechanical characteristics of the SAFER battery are provided in 
Table 6.2-2. Figures 6.2-2 and 6.2-3 show the SAFER battery assembly components and a flight 
assembly, respectively.  
 
Figure 6.2-2. SAFER Battery Assembly Components 
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Figure 6.2-3. SAFER Flight Assembly 
Table 6.2-2. Selected Electrical, Thermal, and Mechanical Characteristics of the SAFER Battery 
(p/n SED33105907-31). 
6.3 Technical Risk Considerations 
Non-rechargeable and rechargeable cell TR is generally defined as a phenomenon which occurs 
when the battery cell rate of heat generation exceeds the rate of heat rejection, causing a rise in 
the cell temperature. As the cell temperature increases, the rates of reaction for exothermic 
chemical processes in the liquid and gas phases increases at a rapid rate. The cell internal 
pressure will simultaneously increase with temperature and other material decomposition 
processes. The next most common events include venting, electrolyte leakage, ignition of gas-
phase flammable gases, smoke, fire, and/or ejecta. Specifically, for the Duracell® Ultra® CR123 
heritage flight non-rechargeable cell design, thermal degradation resulting in TR, may produce 
hazardous fumes of Li and manganese, hydrofluoric acid, Li oxides, carbon, sulfur, and other 
toxic products [14]. Depending on the cell geometry and other TR characteristics, the cell 
contents (e.g., electrodes and windings) may be ejected in an uncontrollable and catastrophic 
manner.  
The phenomena of non-rechargeable Li battery TR hazards were first documented in the 1970s 
and 80s with the increase of commercial and aerospace industry needs for high gravimetric and 
volumetric energy density energy storage systems. The causes of non-rechargeable Li battery 
thermal abuse events have been documented to include those identified in the SAFER battery 
hazard report [15]. In this work, however it was found that the SAFER battery hazard report had 
not identified TR propagation as a hazardous condition.  
SAFER Battery Characteristic Description 
Electrical 
Cell Duracell® Ultra® CR123 
Cell Type Non-rechargeable Li 
Cell Chemistry Li-MnO2 
Nominal Operating Voltage (V) 40 
Operating Voltage Range (V) 36 + 8  
Nominal Capacity (Ah) 3.75 
Useful Life (years) 3.5 ORU 
Thermal 
Nominal Operating Range (C) −20 to +75 
Mechanical 
Dimension (length × width × height, cm) 50.50 × 7.62 × 4.98 
Weight (kg) 1.99 
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Thermal analysis and testing to determine Li battery TR risk is currently required for all NASA 
manned space programs [16]. In some cases, these requirements include verifying that a single-
cell TR event will not cause a TR battery-level cell-to-cell propagation condition. Determining 
the risk of Li battery TR propagation may be assessed by considering the likelihood and 
consequences of the TR event, where:  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∝ [𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠]. 
Traditionally, the likelihood of occurrence of a TR event has been mitigated by implementing 
cell-level design safety features such as vents and PTC devices. To further mitigate the 
likelihood of a TR event, improvements in cell manufacturing quality processes and 
implementation of perceptive cell screening acceptance test methods (such as self-discharge and 
soft-short test protocols) have been employed. Non-destructive cell screening methods such as 
X-ray and computerized tomography-scanning are also commonly used to reduce the risk of TR 
events resulting from energetic internal cell faults.  
The severity of a TR event is highest when a single-cell TR event cascades to adjacent cells or 
battery components resulting in an uncontrollable catastrophic hazard. This type of propagating 
TR event is likely to result in catastrophic battery failure with the possibility of collateral system-
level impacts. 
7.0 Data Analysis 
7.1 Cell Procurement 
Test cell procurement was completed by the JSC Propulsion and Power Division. In support of 
the forecasted scope of testing, approximately 894 COTS button-top Duracell® Ultra® CR123 
Li/MnO2 non-rechargeable cells were procured [17]. This bulk cell procurement was intended to 
exceed the total cell need, plus spares, for the planned testing. The Duracell® Ultra® CR123 
Product Safety Data Sheet is shown in Appendix A. 
7.1.1 Cell Lot Acceptance Testing 
All cells were pre-acceptance tested (i.e. screened) prior to full acceptance testing. Cell-level 
acceptance testing characterized the baseline Duracell® Ultra® CR123 cell performance. The pre-
acceptance and full-acceptance testing scope was tailored from the ISS flight SAFER battery 
acceptance procedure and lot certification test plan [5]. Tailoring rationale was based on 
establishing a minimum set of critical pre-screening and acceptance tests required to meet the 
assessment test objectives. Table 7.1-1 lists the cell pre-acceptance and full-acceptance testing 
performed. Open circuit voltage (OCV), alternating current (AC) impedance, and closed circuit 
voltage (CCV) testing was performed at ambient temperature and pressure conditions [5]. Cell 
identification and physical characteristics were recorded per flight procedures [18]. Cell 
abnormalities observed during visual inspection were documented with digital photography or 
other methods. Cells which pass acceptance testing were candidates for further testing and 
analysis. 
Raw data collected from cell acceptance testing is shown in Appendix B. Visual inspection 
indicated that approximately 97 cells or 10.9% were found to have various physical defects (e.g., 
positive side indentations or external damage to the cell sleeves). Cell defect images were 
reviewed to determine if any cell warranted rejection.  
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CCV testing was performed to measure the amount of voltage drop under constant-current load 
conditions. The CCV performance test is considered superior to an OCV measurement for the 
purposes of determining cell beginning-of-life performance. Results from a representative CCV 
test is shown in Figure 7.1-1. Each cell was discharged at 0.500 + 0.005A for 10 seconds using a 
four-wire measuring circuit. A 30-second OCV period proceeded each CCV load test. 
Table 7.1-1. Pre-acceptance and Full-Acceptance Tests Conducted on Duracell® Ultra®  
CR123 Cells 
Test Description Pass/Fail 
Visual Inspection 
Perform a visual inspection on the test articles and record 
any observations of electrolyte leakage, corrosion, bulges, 
dents, shrink-wrap sleeve integrity, and/or deformations. 
Damage which is deemed 
more than superficial from 
a mechanical or electrical 
insulating standpoint 
Length (mm) Measure and record the length, to 0.1 mm, of each test cell. avg.+ 3
Diameter (mm) Measure and record the length, to 0.1 mm, of each test cell. avg. + 3 
Mass (g) Measure and record the mass, to 0.01 g, of each test cell. avg. + 3 
OCV (V) Measure and record OCV of each cell at room temperature. 3.200 + 0.050 
AC Impedance 
(ohm) 
Measure and record AC impedance at 1 kHz and room 
temperature. 
avg. + 3 
CCV (V) 
Load test each cell at 0.500 + 0.005A (ampere) constant 
current, and then measure cell voltage at the end of a  
10-second discharge period. 
2.890 (minimum) 
Note: Pass/fail criteria are for SAFER flight cells. 
 
Figure 7.1-1. CCV Test for Cell ID# 13 at Ambient Temperature (21 C) Conditions 
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7.1.2 Cell Selection Statistical Analysis 
The cell acceptance test data were analyzed using a non-parametric Method of Fourths [19] 
statistical analysis with the results summarized in Table 7.1-2. These data were used to screen 
cells prior to testing. In addition, these data were used to select cells for 4S and 10S bundle 
manufacturing in support of external short and SAFER battery-level testing.  
The Stem and Leaf plot for the test cell weights is shown in Figure 7.1-2. The median cell mass 
is 16.34 g, with the lower fourth (FL) of 16.29 g, and the upper fourth (FU) of 16.40 g  
(Table 7.1-2). Although the Method of Fourths identified 10 cells as outside values, possibly 
from a different distribution, a review of the Stem and Leaf plot reveals the cells appear to be 
from the same, almost normal, distribution. Therefore, no test cells were rejected due to mass.  
Table 7.1-2. Test Cell Acceptance Test Data Summary  
 
Test FL Median FU 
Mass (g)  16.29 16.34 16.40 
Diameter (mm)  16.40 16.43 16.46 
Length (mm) 34.14 34.18 34.23 
OCV (V) 3.244 3.249 3.251 
CCV (V) 2.867 2.875 2.881 
AC Impedance (ohms) 0.288 0.303 0.314 
The Stem and Leaf plots for the cell diameters and lengths are shown in Figures 7.1-3 and 7.1-4, 
respectively. The Method of Fourths identified 10 cells with outside values for diameter and 17 
cells that had outside values for length (Appendix C). No test cells were rejected for length or 
diameter. 
Stem and Leaf plot of the test cell AC impedance data is shown in Figure 7.1-5. Differences in 
the cell tab electrical contact resistance may have impacted the AC impedance test results. A 
large percentage of the outside values are cells with serial number 100 or lower. Approximately 
31 test cells corresponding to AC impedance values greater than 0.354 ohms (i.e., high outside 
values) were not used in this assessment (Appendix C).  
The Stem and Leaf plot for OCV at ambient temperature is skewed (Figure 7.1-6). There are 2 
outside values that are low, and 18 that are high. Test cells whose OCV values found to have 
outside values were rejected and not used in this assessment (Appendix C).  
The Stem and Leaf plot for the CCV test results is shown in Figure 7.1-7. Variations in electrical 
contact with the test cell temperature differences in time of measurement may have influenced 
the CCV test results. Test cells whose CCV values found to have outside values were rejected 
and not used in this assessment.  
As indicated, test cell CCV acceptance test data was used as the primary means to select cells for 
4S- and 10S-cell bundle manufacturing. OCV and AC impedance acceptance test data was used 
as a secondary criterion for test cell selection. Using the flight cell OCV pass/fail criteria  
(i.e., 3.20 + 0.050 V), 663 of the 894 test cell population cells passed (i.e., 65% pass). However, 
using the flight cell CCV pass/fail criteria (i.e., 2.890 V minimum), 42 of the 894 test cell 
population passed (i.e., 4.7% passed). The technical risk to accepting cells which were outside of 
the flight cell specification range was determined to be low relative to the assessment objectives.  
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Figure 7.1-2. Stem and Leaf Plot of Mass (g) Measurements for Duracell® Ultra® CR123 Test Cells 
 
Figure 7.1-3. Stem and Leaf Plot of Diameter (mm) Measurements for Duracell® Ultra® CR123 
Test Cells 
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Figure 7.1-4. Stem and Leaf Plot of Length (mm) Measurements for Duracell® Ultra® CR123  
Test Cells 
 
Figure 7.1-5. Stem and Leaf Plot of AC Impedance (ohms) Measurements at 1 kHz and Ambient 
Temperature for Duracell® Ultra® CR123 Test Cells 
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Figure 7.1-6. Stem and Leaf Plot of OCV (V) Measurements at Ambient Temperature for Duracell® 
Ultra® CR123 Test Cells 
 
Figure 7.1-7. Stem and Leaf Plot of CCV Test Measurements at Ambient Temperature for 
Duracell® Ultra® CR123 Test Cells 
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7.1.3 Cell Matching 
Cells selected for testing were matched using the Stem and Leaf plot statistical analysis results. 
Although cell matching for the purposes of manufacturing SAFER flight batteries is not 
specified, industry best practices dictate that cell matching reduces cell-to-cell variability within 
a string of electrical connected cells [20]. 
7.1.4 Summary and Findings 
The Duracell® Ultra® CR123 cells were procured and screened using a tailored SAFER flight 
cell acceptance test procedure. The test results were analyzed to screen the cell population in 
support of cell selection and matching for 4S- and 10S-cell bundle manufacturing. Statistical 
analysis was used to identify outliers from the test cell population. (See Section 8.1, F-1 through 
F-3). 
7.2 External Short Test 
7.2.1 Objectives 
The objective of this testing was to evaluate the TR safety risk caused by an external short to the 
SAFER battery. Specifically, the ability of the external PTC device to protect the SAFER 
battery, under selected external short conditions, was evaluated. 
7.2.2 Background 
Lessons learned from the B-787 ELT Li battery incident root cause and corrective action 
(RCCA) investigation were incorporated into the approach for the subject testing [3]. The RCCA 
investigation concluded the inability of the ELT non-rechargeable Li-MnO2 battery PTC device 
to reliably protect the system from a high-impedance external short was a causal factor. This 
determination was in part due to a PTC thermal fuse trip analysis under various environmental 
operating conditions. 
The SAFER batteries are individually protected from external shorts by Schottky bypass diodes 
and external PTC devices (Figures 7.2-1 and 7.2-2 [21]). The Schottky bypass diodes (1N5819) 
protect each cell by providing a “bypass” function for shunting discharge current around a weak 
or failed open cell. These blocking diodes are supplied by Vishay General Semiconductor 
(Sheldon, CT). 
The PTC (SRP-200F) devices are designed to function as resettable thermal fuses, which will 
trip and inhibit the current flow as a function of temperature (Appendix D). Furthermore, each 
individual cell has an internal PTC device located under the positive terminal cap. Under 
elevated temperature conditions, the internal cell PTC thermal fuse will trip, and block current 
flow through the bundle cell string. Elevated temperature may be caused by high voltage or 
current from an abuse condition.  
The effect of temperature on the hold and trip currents for the SRP-200F PTC device is shown in 
Figure 7.2-3 [22,23]. The rated hold and trip currents are specified in still air at 20 C. However, 
as a thermally activated fuse, any change in temperature will affect PTC device performance. 
SAFER battery operating conditions in Region A will trip the SRP-200F PTC thermal fuse, 
causing a decrease in bundle-level current flow. Operating conditions corresponding to Region B 
will cause the PTC device to trip or remain in a low-resistance state. Under these operating 
conditions, the PTC device may, or may not, adequately protect the bundle from current flow. 
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Finally, Region C operating conditions will cause the PTC device to remain in a low-resistance 
state, or hold condition, whereby the battery bundle electrical circuit will operate nominally. 
These data were used to select the external short load values for the 4S- and 10S-cell bundle-
level external short tests conducted in this assessment. 
 
Figure 7.2-1. Schematic Drawing of SAFER Battery 4S-cell Bundle 
External SRP-200F PTC thermal fuse is located between cells BT2 and BT3 [21] 
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Figure 7.2-2. Schematic Drawing of SAFER Battery 10S-cell Bundle 
External SRP-200F PTC thermal fuse is located between cells BT12 and BT13 [21] 
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Figure 7.2-3. Effect of Temperature on Hold and Trip Currents for the SAFER Battery SRP-200F 
PTC Thermal Fuse [22,23] 
7.2.3 Test Plan 
A test plan was developed and managed throughout the assessment (Appendix E). Test plan 
updates were provided to the JSC ESTA organization to support test procedure, test facility, and 
allocation of other test resources [24]. Test readiness reviews (TRRs) and delta-TRRs were 
conducted to support technical changes (e.g., test matrix or test article configuration changes) to 
the assessment baseline. A test hazard analysis was conducted to assess and mitigate any safety 
hazards involved with the SAFER battery test program [25]. Hazard controls were implemented 
to mitigate any safety risk to personnel, test articles, or facilities. 
Four and ten-cell bundle testing, Tables 7.2-1 and 7.2-2, respectively, was conducted to 
characterize their safety performance under specified external test conditions. External load and 
PTC device installation were chosen as the test variables. PTC thermal fuse location was 
consistent with the flight SAFER battery 4S- and 10S-cell bundle configurations (Figure 7.2-1 
and 7.2-2). External load resistance values were chosen based on Figure 7.2-3 and previous 
SAFER battery test results [26]. All test bundles were configured in a flight-like configuration 
with Schottky bypass diodes. All bundle test articles were equipped with thermocouples, with a 
tolerance of +2 C, positioned to sufficiently measure temperature gradients (Figure 7.2-4). 
Images of representative 4S- and 10S-cell bundle test configurations are shown in Figures 7.2-5 
and 7.2-6, respectively. 
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Table 7.2-1. External Short Test Matrix for the 4S-cell Bundle Safety Tests 
PTC device region corresponds to Figure 7.2-1.  
Test  
No. 
Electrical 
Configuration 
External 
Load 
(ohm) 
Schottky 
By-Pass 
Diodes 
PTC 
Device 
Region 
PTC 
Device 
Installed 
1 4S 10 Yes C No 
2 4S 10 Yes C Yes 
3 4S 3.5 Yes B No 
4 4S 3.5 Yes B Yes 
5 4S 1.0 Yes A No 
6 4S 1.0 Yes A Yes 
7 4S 0.10 Yes A No 
8 4S 0.10 Yes A Yes 
9 4S 0.05 Yes A No 
10 4S 0.05 Yes A Yes 
Note: All testing was conducted at ambient temperature and pressure. 
 
 
 
Table 7.2-2. External Short Test Matrix for the 10S-cell Bundle Safety Tests 
PTC device region corresponds to Figure 7.2-2. 
Test  
No. 
Electrical 
Configuration 
External 
Load 
(ohm) 
Schottky 
By-Pass 
Diodes 
PTC 
Device 
Region 
PTC 
Device 
Installed 
1 10S 25 Yes C No 
2 10S 25 Yes C Yes 
3 10S 9 Yes B No 
4 10S 9 Yes B Yes 
5 10S 1.0 Yes A No 
6 10S 1.0 Yes A Yes 
7 10S 0.5 Yes A No 
8 10S 0.5 Yes A Yes 
9 10S 3 Yes A No 
10 10S 3 Yes A No 
Note: All testing was conducted at ambient temperature and pressure. 
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a) 4S-cell bundle.    b) 10S-cell bundle. 
Figure 7.2-4. Thermocouple Placement for SAFER Battery Bundle External Short Testing 
 
a) Top-view of 4S-cell bundle test article (external PTC device installed). 
 
b) Top-view of packaged 4S-cell bundle test article (external PTC device installed). 
Figure 7.2-5. External Short Test Configuration of a Representative 4S-cell Bundle Test Article 
 
External 
SRP-200F PTC 
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Figure 7.2-6. External Short Testing 10S-cell Bundle Test Configuration 
7.2.4 Results and Discussion 
The SAFER battery (P/N SED33105907) has been safety certified and qualified per ISS 
requirements [27]. As part of the certification, JSC ESTA conducted SAFER battery testing in 
support of an updated SAFER battery hazard report [27,28]. This testing included external short 
testing (i.e., no external SRP-200F PTC device; Schottky diodes installed; 3.5-ohm resistive 
load) of a SAFER battery 14S (one 4S bundle electrically connected in series with a 10S bundle) 
bundle. The results indicated that some cells exhibited venting and electrolyte leakage. 
Maximum measured cell temperatures during this test were 123 C, which is below the 180 C 
Li melting point. As such, there was no evidence of cell TR was observed [15]. 
7.2.4.1 4S-Cell Bundle External Short Testing 
A results summary for the 4S-cell bundle external short testing are shown in Table 7.2-3. Ten 
4S-cell bundle external short tests were conducted. Peak temperatures were highest for test 
articles with no installed external PTC device. Test 12 (i.e., 3.5-ohm, no PTC device) had the 
highest peak temperatures, while Test 19 (i.e., 0.05-ohm, PTC device) had the lowest peak 
temperatures. External short test results for Test #12 are shown in Figures 7.2-7 and 7.2-8 and 
specific PTC trip and rest function is shown in Table 7.2-4. The internal Cell #2 (cell ID#344) 
PTC thermal fuse trips instantaneously at approximately 80.2oC, followed by Cell #3 internal 
PTC thermal fuse instantaneously tripping at approximately 81.1oC. The subsequent decrease in 
bundle load current aids in mitigating the internal temperatures of Cells #1 and #4. As a result, 
the internal cell PTC thermal fuses for these cells did not trip. Cell voltage PTC re-set signatures 
were observed to gradually transition from a tripped state to a re-set completion state over a  
5-6 min. time period. Cell #3 PTC device re-set temperature range was 79.7oC (re-set initiation) 
to 73.3oC (re-set complete), followed by Cell #2 internal PTC device re-setting between 82.7oC 
(re-set initiation) to 66.9oC (re-set complete). The minor variation between the PTC trip and  
 External 
SRP-200F PTC 
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re-set initiation temperatures is most likely due to an expected hysteresis in trip/re-set 
performance, which is common in commercial PTC devices. Due to the tripping of the Cell #2 
and Cell #3 internal PTC thermal fuses, the 4S-cell bundle was not at risk of over-discharge or 
other adverse abuse condition. Cell #2 reached a peak of 91.7 C, which is significantly less than 
the expected TR temperature of approximately 175−180 C for the SAFER battery cell design. 
Post-test inspections indicated no evidence of cell venting or electrolyte leakage (Figure 7.2-9). 
 
Note: External resistive load = 3.5 ohm; no external PTC device. Ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-7. Voltage-current Characteristics for SAFER Battery 4S-cell Bundle External Short 
Test #12 
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Note: External resistive load = 3.5 ohm; no external PTC device. Ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-8. Voltage-temperature Characteristics for SAFER Battery 4S-cell Bundle External 
Short Test #12 
  
 
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-14-00963 Page #: 35 of 141 
Table 7.2-3. Summary of Results From the 4S-cell Bundle External Short Testing 
Test Date
(Test No)
Test Decription
(Cell ID)
Cell ID
Peak 
Temp 
(°C)
Peak 
Current 
(A)
Peak 
Voltage 
(V)
Pre-OCV 
(V)
Post-OCV 
(V)
Pre AC Imp 
(Ω)
Post AC 
Imp (Ω)
11-Mar-15 10Ω, 1.1A, No PTC 1-4S 1.13 11.89 12.78 7.08 1.00 OC
(10) Cell 170 Cell 1 41.59 NR 1.64 NR OC
Cell 297 Cell 2 42.08 NR 1.74 NR OC
Cell 299 Cell 3 42.28 NR 1.94 NR OC
Cell 300 Cell 4 39.29 NR 1.73 NR OC
12-Mar-15 10Ω, 1.1A, PTC 2-4S 1.31 12.88 12.86 5.12 1.05 OC
(11) Cell 303 Cell 1 41.12 3.21 1.32 0.25 OC
Cell 304 Cell 2 45.86 3.21 1.28 0.24 OC
Cell 305 Cell 3 43.95 3.21 1.22 0.25 OC
Cell 320 Cell 4 42.51 3.21 1.32 0.24 OC
23-Mar-15 3.5Ω, 3.1A, No PTC 5-4S 28.33 12.88 12.85 3.25 0.98 OC
(12) Cell 337 Cell 1 79.72 3.21 0.72 0.23 OC
Cell 344 Cell 2 91.72 3.22 1.34 0.24 2.87
Cell 347 Cell 3 86.80 3.22 0.61 0.24 OC
Cell 500 Cell 4 76.14 3.21 0.61 0.24 OC
25-Mar-15 3.5Ω, 3.1A, PTC 4-4S 28.18 12.91 12.86 11.46 1.10 1.20
(13) Cell 330 Cell 1 63.75 3.22 2.87 0.26 0.28
Cell 333 Cell 2 69.27 3.22 2.86 0.25 0.28
Cell 336 Cell 3 67.20 3.21 2.87 0.25 0.27
Cell 470 Cell 4 64.35 3.21 2.86 0.28 0.30
30-Mar-15 1Ω, 11.0A, No PTC 3-4S 7.19 12.96 12.86 4.41 1.05 OC
(14) Cell 307 Cell 1 84.42 3.21 1.42 0.26 OC
Cell 314 Cell 2 89.71 3.21 1.25 0.26 OC
Cell 329 Cell 3 78.42 3.22 0.79 0.26 OC
Cell 420 Cell 4 81.43 3.22 0.97 0.27 OC
31-Mar-15 1Ω, 11.0A, PTC 8-4S 7.00 12.97 12.84 11.80 1.02 0.92
(15) Cell 368 Cell 1 38.38 3.21 2.96 0.25 0.21
Cell 369 Cell 2 42.49 3.22 2.97 0.25 0.21
Cell 370 Cell 3 45.92 3.21 2.97 0.25 0.21
Cell 549 Cell 4 40.33 3.20 2.97 0.22 0.20
1-Apr-15 0.1Ω, 110.0A, No PTC 9-4S 14.56 13.04 12.85 4.47 0.96 OC
(16) Cell 374 Cell 1 68.65 3.22 1.15 0.25 OC
Cell 378 Cell 2 78.81 3.22 1.35 0.24 0.41
Cell 382 Cell 3 75.77 3.22 1.14 0.25 OC
Cell 864 Cell 4 76.55 3.21 0.86 0.22 OC
1-Apr-15 0.1Ω, 110.0A, PTC 10-4S 13.70 12.45 12.85 12.05 1.02 0.94
(17) Cell 384 Cell 1 35.83 3.22 3.01 0.26 0.22
Cell 392 Cell 2 42.04 3.22 3.02 0.26 0.23
Cell 669 Cell 3 45.07 3.20 3.01 0.24 0.22
Cell 871 Cell 4 37.92 3.21 3.01 0.22 0.20
6-Apr-15  0.05Ω, 220.0A, No PTC 11-4S 14.82 13.09 12.93 4.66 0.96 OC
(18) Cell 077 Cell 1 75.09 3.23 1.09 0.24 OC
Cell 083 Cell 2 81.94 3.23 1.41 0.25 OC
Cell 199 Cell 3 71.46 3.23 1.02 0.25 OC
Cell 203 Cell 4 79.38 3.23 1.15 0.24 OC
16-Apr-15  0.05Ω, 220.0A, PTC 12-4S 14.08 12.41 12.88 12.01 0.96 0.95
(19) Cell 711 Cell 1 34.33 3.22 3.00 0.24 0.23
Cell 855 Cell 2 38.95 3.22 3.00 0.23 0.22
Cell 868 Cell 3 40.67 3.22 3.00 0.24 0.22
Cell 870 Cell 4 36.03 3.22 3.00 0.23 0.21  
Note: No evidence of cell-level TR was observed. NR - Not recorded, and OC - Open Circuit. 
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Table 7.2-4. Summary of PTC Function Test 12 
 
   
a) Pre-test images. 
   
b) Post-test images. 
Figure 7.2-9. External Short Test Configuration Pre- and Post-test Images of Test #12 
Note: No evidence of cell venting, electrolyte leakage, ignition of gas-phase flammable gases, smoke, 
and/or fire, or TR was observed. 
Test #13 was conducted to investigate the effectiveness of the installed SRP-200F external PTC 
device on a 4S-cell bundle during an external short. Test conditions for Tests #12 and #13 were 
identical, except the Test #13 4S-cell bundle had an external SRP-200F PTC thermal fuse 
installed (Figure 7.2-10). External short test results for Test #13 are shown in Figures 7.2-11 and 
7.2-12. Cell #2 (cell ID #333) reached a peak temperature of 69.3 C, which was less than Cell 
#2 (cell ID #344) from Test #12. The external PTC device tripped at approximately 65 C and 
23A. Subsequent to the external PTC thermal fuse trip event, the 4S-cell bundle temperature 
decreases with no evidence of any internal cell fuse trip events. The external PTC device was 
observed to function as expected for Tests #11, #15 (Figures 7.2-13 and 7.2-14), #17, and #19.  
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a) Test #12 – No PTC device.  b) Test #13 – PTC device installed. 
Figure 7.2-10. External Short Test Configuration Pre-test Images of Test #12 and #13 4S-cell 
Bundle Test Articles 
Note: Test #12 and #13 utilized an external resistive load = 3.5 ohm. 
 
Figure 7.2-11. Voltage-current Characteristics for SAFER Battery 4S-cell  
Bundle External Short Test #13 
External resistive load = 3.5 ohm; PTC device installed. All testing was conducted at ambient 
temperature and pressure. 
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Note: External resistive load = 3.5 ohm; PTC device installed. All testing was conducted at  
ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-12. Voltage-temperature Characteristics for SAFER Battery 4S-cell  
Bundle External Short Test #13 
  
 
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-14-00963 Page #: 39 of 141 
 
Note: External resistive load = 1.0 ohm; PTC device installed. All testing was conducted at  
ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-13. Voltage-temperature Characteristics for SAFER Battery 4S-cell  
Bundle External Short Test #15 
 
Note: External resistive load = 1.0 ohm; PTC device installed. All testing was conducted at  
ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-14. Voltage-current Characteristics for SAFER Battery 4S-cell  
Bundle External Short Test #15 
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7.2.4.2 10S-Cell Bundle External Short Testing 
A results summary for the 10S-cell bundle external short testing are shown in Table 7.2-5. 
Supplementary Test #2 utilized a 10S-cell bundle, with no external PTC device and cell Schottky 
diodes, configured into a SAFER battery housing (Figure 7.2-15). This test configuration was 
similar to a previous work completed by the JSC ESTA team [28]. The 3.0-ohm external load 
value was chosen based on an estimate of the maximum possible power output of the 10S 
bundle.  
 
a) 10S bundle test article packaged with adjacent 10S bundles. Adjacent 10S bundles served only as 
thermal mass simulators. 
 
b) Completed 10S bundle with SAFER battery housing electrical and mechanical configuration. 
Figure 7.2-15. External Short Test Configuration Pre-test Images of Supplementary Test #2 
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Table 7.2-5. Summary of Results From the 10S-cell Bundle External Short Testing 
Test Date
(Test No)
Test Decription
(Cell ID)
Cell ID
Peak 
Temp 
(°C)
Peak 
Current 
(A)
Peak 
Voltage 
(V)
Pre-OCV 
(V)
Post-OCV 
(V)
Pre AC Imp 
(Ω)
Post AC 
Imp (Ω)
7-Apr-15 25Ω, 1.1A, No PTC 1-10S 2.05 31.98 32.19 15.54 2.47 OC
(20) Cell 034 Cell 1 64.83 3.22 1.50 0.25 OC
Cell 041 Cell 2 70.83 3.22 1.38 0.26 OC
Cell 045 Cell 3 83.35 3.22 2.03 0.25 1.11
Cell 047 Cell 4 82.11 3.22 1.65 0.25 OC
Cell 051 Cell 5 75.35 3.22 1.47 0.25 OC
Cell 052 Cell 6 75.50 3.22 1.54 0.26 OC
Cell 054 Cell 7 79.75 3.22 1.55 0.24 OC
Cell 058 Cell 8 76.50 3.22 1.56 0.26 OC
Cell 061 Cell 9 67.50 3.21 1.45 0.25 OC
Cell 064 Cell 10 57.74 3.22 1.47 0.23 OC
8-Apr-15 25Ω, 1.1A, PTC 2-10S 2.00 30.60 30.55 12.87 2.23 OC
(21) Cell 073 Cell 1 70.02 3.06 1.58 0.23 OC
Cell 075 Cell 2 72.54 2.99 1.48 0.21 OC
Cell 091 Cell 3 73.99 3.00 2.12 0.21 0.57
Cell 093 Cell 4 83.82 3.00 1.68 0.21 OC
Cell 095 Cell 5 75.63 3.00 1.43 0.21 OC
Cell 098 Cell 6 80.42 3.00 1.54 0.20 OC
Cell 101 Cell 7 73.98 3.01 0.07 0.21 OC
Cell 121 Cell 8 76.18 3.01 1.33 0.20 OC
Cell 132 Cell 9 67.23 3.01 0.05 0.20 OC
Cell 134 Cell 10 63.69 3.06 1.57 0.22 OC
Test #22 9.0Ω, 3.1A, No PTC
Test #23 9.0Ω, 3.1A, PTC
9-Apr-15 1.0Ω, 3.1A, No PTC 5-10S 11.62 32.00 31.96 15.70 2.44 OC
(24) Cell 001 Cell 1 86.18 3.07 0.96 0.22 OC
Cell 190 Cell 2 80.95 3.22 1.50 0.26 2.54
Cell 194 Cell 3 87.59 3.21 2.40 0.25 0.26
Cell 195 Cell 4 88.95 3.21 2.27 0.24 0.30
Cell 196 Cell 5 79.86 NR 1.54 NR 2.22
Cell 197 Cell 6 62.32 3.21 1.22 0.25 OC
Cell 198 Cell 7 84.15 3.21 2.73 0.25 0.27
Cell 201 Cell 8 90.94 3.21 1.30 0.25 OC
Cell 205 Cell 9 82.70 3.21 1.06 0.25 2.93
Cell 209 Cell 10 71.50 3.21 1.03 0.25 OC
Test #25 1.0Ω, 27.5A, PTC
Test #26 0.50Ω, 55A, No PTC
Test #27 0.50Ω, 55A, PTC
14-Apr-15 3.0Ω, No PTC; Open-Air 3-10S 4.45 31.31 32.10 12.73 2.44 OC
Cell  127 Cell 1 78.73 3.21 1.03 0.26 OC
Cell  137 Cell 2 84.51 3.21 1.18 0.25 OC
Cell  139 Cell 3 78.94 3.21 2.18 0.25 0.29
Cell  143 Cell 4 84.64 3.22 1.43 0.24 2.68
Cell  151 Cell 5 79.47 3.21 0.87 0.24 OC
Cell  154 Cell 6 88.01 3.21 1.26 0.25 OC
Cell  156 Cell 7 87.45 3.21 1.54 0.24 OC
Cell  157 Cell 8 69.71 3.21 1.14 0.24 OC
Cell  161 Cell 9 81.18 3.21 1.12 0.25 OC
Cell  163 Cell 10 73.99 3.21 1.04 0.24 OC
20-Apr-15 3.0Ω, No PTC; Housing 7-10S 5.73 29.89 31.76 16.91 2.50 OC
Cell 035 Cell 1 96.60 3.18 2.52 0.37 0.56
Cell 247 Cell 2 99.52 3.17 1.40 0.38 OC
Cell 248 Cell 3 100.81 3.17 1.68 0.37 0.68
Cell 250 Cell 4 96.75 3.17 1.39 0.38 OC
Cell 253 Cell 5 90.45 3.17 1.84 0.38 OC
Cell 255 Cell 6 86.08 3.17 1.90 0.39 OC
Cell 257 Cell 7 96.00 3.17 1.82 0.38 OC
Cell 258 Cell 8 96.47 3.17 1.73 0.39 OC
Cell 259 Cell 9 93.85 3.20 2.19 0.39 OC
Cell 265 Cell 10 86.71 3.20 1.58 0.39 OC
Suppl.
Test #2
Postponed
Postponed
Postponed
Postponed
Postponed
Suppl.
Test #1
 
Note: No evidence of cell-level TR was observed. NR- Not recorded, and OC - Open circuit. 
External short test results for Supplementary Test #2 are shown in Figures 7.2-16 and 7.2-17. 
After the external short was applied, the results indicated that except for Cell #10, all the 
individual cell internal PTC thermal fuses tripped between 30 and 90 C. Cell #8 (cell ID#201) 
reached a peak of 90.9 C, which is similar to the peak temperature of Cell #2 (ID#344) 
measured in the 4S-cell bundle Test #12. The internal cell PTC device for Cell #10 (ID #209) did 
not trip, which corresponded to the lowest peak temperature (71.5 C) in the 10S-cell bundle 
string. Post-test visual inspections of the 10S-cell test article confirmed that there was no 
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evidence of cell venting or electrolyte leakage (Figure 7.2-18). These data are similar to the 
SAFER battery 14S string external short test results [28].  
 
Note: External resistive load = 3.0 ohm; no PTC device installed. All testing conducted at  
ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-16. Voltage-current Characteristics for SAFER Battery 10S-cell  
Bundle External Short Supplementary Test #2 
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Note: External resistive load = 3.0 ohm; no PTC device installed. All testing conducted at  
ambient temperature and pressure. 
Figure 7.2-17. Voltage-temperature Characteristics for SAFER 10S-cell  
Bundle External Short Supplementary Test #2 
 
Figure 7.2-18. External Short Test Configuration Post-test Images of Supplementary Test #2 
No evidence of cell venting or TR.  
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7.2.5 Summary and Findings 
SAFER battery testing was performed to evaluate the safety risk of TR caused by an external 
short to the SAFER battery. Specifically, the ability of the external PTC device to protect the 
SAFER battery, under selected external short conditions was evaluated. (See Section 8.2, O-1 
through O-4.) 
7.3 Single-Cell Trigger-Cell TR Testing  
7.3.1 Objectives 
The objective of this testing was to characterize the COTS Duracell® Ultra® CR123 SAFER 
battery cell under various heater trigger test conditions. This testing enabled optimization of 
heater power, location, and type for the development of test procedures in support of the 
subsequent SAFER battery TR test phase.  
7.3.2 Test Methodology 
Prior to performing TR testing at the battery level, single cells were tested with different heater 
powers to optimize the wattage that would initiate a TR event. Trigger-cell TR tests were 
conducted by placing a heater on the cell housing. Trials were conducted with the heater on the 
cell side or on the bottom to determine its worst-case location. Various heater powers were used 
to experimentally determine the most effective heater input required to initiate TR. Optimizing 
the heater power was necessary to reduce the possibility of predisposing the surrounding cells to 
enter TR via heating when bundle/battery-level testing was performed. 
As the cells were under test, at the moment TR occurred, the cell heater was manually 
deactivated so as to not continue to provide an additional source of heat input into the cell.  
Single-cell trigger-cell tests were conducted at ambient and a worst-case temperature of 49 °C. 
The 49 °C ‘hot-case’ test condition was derived from the 38 °C maximum hot case thermal 
environment the battery could be exposed to during the mission, plus an 11 °C thermal analysis 
uncertainty margin [29,30]. Test articles were subjected to the test temperature for at least 1 hour 
prior to commencing the tests, and were actively maintained at the test temperature +3 °C to the 
point in time when the cell heaters were activated.  
A summary of the test conditions and results are shown in Table 7.3-1. Test articles were 
randomly chosen from cells successfully screened to the cell acceptance test (Section 7.1), which 
was based on the ISS Lot Acceptance Test criteria [5]. Two cells were tested at each set of 
conditions to replicate results. In some cases, the heater power and location was adapted based 
on results from prior tests. These modifications were to add tests that could provide additional 
data as required, or to eliminate tests that were deemed no longer necessary. 
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Table 7.3-1. Test Conditions and Results for Single-Cell Trigger-Cell Tests 
 
7.3.3 Single-Cell Trigger-Cell Test Set-up 
Two different types of heaters (i.e., patch and ceramic) were used for the testing. Initially, a 
patch heater was used, which functioned reliably for heater powers below 35 W. The patch 
heater consists of nichrome wire looped in a serpentine pattern (Figure 7.3-1a), which was 
positioned in between two pieces of thermosettable glass cloth tape (Figure 7.3-1b). A sheet of 
mica was affixed to the heater top and the assembly was further wrapped in glass cloth tape 
(Figure 7.3-2a). Insulated copper wires were soldered onto the heater wire ends and wrapped in 
glass tape to complete the heater assembly (Figure 7.3-2b) [31]. The patch heater design was 
successfully used in the SAFER battery TR Tests #1 and #2. 
Trial 
Run
Cell 
ID
Heater 
Power
(W)
Heater 
Location
Cell Temp
(
o
C)
Time to 
TR (min)
Cell Jacket 
Temp at Start 
of TR
(°C)
Max Cell 
Jacket 
Temp
(°C)
Max 
Positive 
Terminal 
Probe Temp 
(°C)
Comments
1 53 15 Bottom Ambient - - ~ 161 N/A No thermal runaway after 44 min
1 70 15 Bottom Ambient ~ 22 ~ 199 ~ 575 N/A
2 44 15 Side Ambient ~ 11 ~ 180 ~ 733 N/A
2 50 15 Side Ambient ~ 9 ~ 158 ~ 518 N/A
3 119 10 Bottom Ambient - - ~ 120 - No thermal runaway after 1 hr
3 123 10 Bottom Ambient - - ~ 119 - No thermal runaway after 1 hr
4 129 10 Side Ambient - - ~ 143 - No thermal runaway after 1 hr
4 133 10 Side Ambient - - ~ 162 - No thermal runaway after 1 hr
5 142 20 Bottom Ambient ~ 8.5 ~175 ~ 621 ~632
5 167 20 Bottom Ambient ~ 8.3 ~172 ~ 645 ~882
6 169 20 Side Ambient ~ 5.7 ~209 ~ 734 ~409
6 175 20 Side Ambient ~ 6.5 ~204 ~ 684 ~532
7 406 25 Bottom Ambient ~ 7 ~155 ~ 661 ~ 275
7 419 25 Bottom Ambient ~ 6.3 ~ 177 ~649 ~ 1158 Heater power unstable
8 208 25 Side Ambient ~ 4.7 ~ 182 ~ 582 ~ 340
8 402 25 Side Ambient ~ 5 ~ 176 ~ 608 ~ 437
12 216 15 Side 49 ~ 9:31 ~ 250 ~ 746 ~ 690 False start @ < 00:00; Heater not connected
12 246 15 Side 49 ~ 7:19 ~ 198 ~ 569 ~ 430 Clamp TC faulty
16 252 20 Side 49 ~ 5:23 ~ 178 ~ 735 ~562
16 308 20 Side 49 ~ 6:10 ~ 178 ~ 585 ~ 652
18 312 25 Side 49 ~ 4:16 ~ 170 ~ 577 ~ 502
18 318 25 Side 49 ~ 3:51 ~ 228 ~ 717 ~ 552 False start @ < 00:00; Heater not connected
22a 251 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:26 ~ 186 ~ 700 N/A
22a 522 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:45 ~ 173 N/A N/A Heater appears to have shorted
23a 579 40 Side Ambient ~ 2:22 ~ 216 N/A N/A Lost jacket temp after ~ 230°C
23a 839 40 Side Ambient ~ 1:54 ~ 170 ~ 730 N/A Heater appears to have shorted
S12 17 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:18 ~ 134.8 ~ 851 N/A
Spare cell; Ceramic heater (6.526 Ω DMM, 6.8 Ω data); TC on cell 
jacket
S13 135 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:14 ~ 170.2 ~ 694 N/A
Spare cell; Ceramic heater (6.417 Ω DMM, 6.5 Ω data); TC on cell 
jacket
S14 25 35 Side Ambient ~ 3:10 ~ 155 ~ 668 N/A
Spare cell; Ceramic heater (12.47 Ω DMM, 7.2 Ω data); TC on cell 
can; Op Error
S15 78 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:48 ~ 146.9 ~ 599 N/A
Spare cell; Ceramic heater (7.49 Ω DMM, 7.2 Ω data); TC on cell 
can
22b 128 35 Side Ambient ~ 2: 47 ~ 348 ~ 492 N/A
Ceramic heater (6.56 Ω DMM, 6.4 Ω data); TC on cell can; Cell can 
TC too close to heater
22b 315 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:06 ~ 169 ~ 1280 N/A Ceramic heater (6.713 Ω DMM, 6.6 Ω data); TC on cell can
23b 381 40 Side Ambient ~ 2:07 ~ 130 ~ 622 N/A Ceramic heater (6.88 Ω DMM, 6.8 Ω data); TC on cell can
23b 706 40 Side Ambient ~ 2:07 ~ 175 ~ 827 N/A Ceramic heater (9.89 Ω DMM, 7.0 Ω data); TC on cell can
22c 26 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:27 ~ 173 ~ 655 ~ 375 Ceramic heater (7.1 Ω DMM, 6.9 Ω data); TC on cell can
22c 266 35 Side Ambient ~ 2:18 ~ 125 ~ 551 ~ 619 Ceramic heater (6.8 Ω DMM, 6.9 Ω data); TC on cell can
23c 486 40 Side Ambient ~ 2:00 ~ 163 ~ 700 ~ 216 Ceramic heater (6.9 Ω DMM, 6.9 Ω data); TC on cell can
23c 740 40 Side Ambient ~1:40 ~ 110 ~ 213 ~ 605
Ceramic heater (7.2 Ω DMM, 7.0 Ω data); TC on cell can; Cell OCV 
3.02 V (low); Heater Current = ~ 5A startup then ~ 2.3A
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a)                                                                                  b) 
Figure 7.3-1. Part a) Loops of nichrome wire on glass tape during heater assembly.   
Part b) Nichrome wire sandwiched between glass tape 
     
a)                                                                            b) 
Figure 7.3-2. Part a) Mica on heater top to be wrapped in glass tape.   
Part b) Completed patch heater. 
When it became necessary to use higher power to more rapidly initiate a TR event, the patch 
heater was no longer adequate to provide stable current at high power. Based on previous JSC 
ESTA test experience, a ceramic heater design was identified for use at power levels above 
35 W. The ceramic heater design was successfully used in the SAFER battery TR Tests #3  
and #4. 
The ceramic heater consists of nichrome wire looped in a serpentine pattern (Figure 7.3-3a) on a 
sheet of mica paper. A high-temperature alumina ceramic-based adhesive and sealant putty was 
then applied onto the nichrome wire (Figure 7.3-3b), and allowed to dry for 12 hours. Insulated 
copper wires were twisted around the heater wires. Additional putty was applied to the cell in an 
area equivalent to the heater size and allowed to dry (Figure 7.3-3c). The heater was positioned 
on the putty covered cell with the wires facing outwards. Putty was applied to fill cracks and 
other discontinuities and allowed to dry (Figure 7.3-4a). The heater was then covered with 
additional mica paper (Figure 7.3-4b). Finally, mica tape was used to cover the entire cell/heater 
arrangement and secured with Kapton® tape (Figure 7.3-4c). The ceramic heater fabrication 
cycle required several days for each test article. 
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                   a)                                                  b)                                                             c) 
Figure 7.3-3. Part a) Loops of nichrome. Part b) Nichrome wire covered with sealant putty.  
Part c) Cell covered with sealant putty and mica paper. 
       
                              a)                                                        b)                                                 c) 
Figure 7.3-4. Part a) Putty applied to cell. Part b) Mica paper covering heater. Part c) Mica tape 
covering cell, secured by Kapton® tape. 
Figure 7.3-5 shows a comparison of patch and ceramic heater operating at 35 W. The start time 
for all heaters is normalized to time “zero.” Cells ID# 251 and 522, which used the patch heater, 
the heater power began increasing about midway during the run. Cell ID# 522 heater shorted at 
some point during the run as the data indicated a lack of control with exponentially increasing 
power toward the end of the run. Cell ID# 026, 128, 266, and 315 ceramic heaters performed 
more consistently. 
For the test set-up, the cell was fastened to an aluminum block using a hose clamp. The 
aluminum block was anchored to a table. Low thermal conductivity felt with high temperature 
stability (i.e., FiberFrax® Durafelt™) was used to thermally insulate the cell from the block and 
the clamp. A patch heater was installed either on the cell side (i.e., between the cell and block), 
or on the cell bottom. A thermocouple was installed on the cell side, located between the cell and 
clamp. This thermocouple location was on the opposite cell side from the heater in cases where 
heaters were not on the cell bottom. Thermocouples were attached to the aluminum block and the 
clamp and were suspended in the air. In later tests, an additional thermocouple was placed near 
the positive cell terminal to measure the ejected cell content temperature during a TR event.  
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Figure 7.3-5. Comparison of Patch and Ceramic Heater Performance at 35 W 
Figure 7.3-6 shows a diagram of the test set-up with heater and thermocouple locations. In 
Figure 7.3-7, these features are annotated on a cell image within the test set-up.  
 
Figure 7.3-6. Diagram of Test Set-up, Heater, and Thermocouple Locations 
 
TC near positive terminal 
TC on aluminum 
block 
TC on cell 
(side wall) 
TC affixed to 
hose clamp 
TC in air 
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a)                                                                                   b) 
 
c) 
Figure 7.3-7. Test Set-up, Heater, and Thermocouple Locations 
For tests in which the plan called for the cell to be at 49 °C, the cells were: outfitted with a 
heater, thermocouples, clamp, and insulating felt and placed in a 49 °C thermal chamber for 
15 hours minimum. The cells were then transferred to an open-air test area where they were 
placed on a hotplate set to 49 °C. Insulating felt and a plastic bin were placed over the cell to 
maintain temperature while the cell was electrically connected. The total transfer time from the 
thermal chamber to the test cell was under 5 minutes. 
For installation ease and test engineer safety, an anchor wire was used in lieu of the aluminum 
block and hose clamp to secure the cell in the test area for the bulk of the hot test cases, and for 
ambient tests that were chronologically run after the hot cases. Figure 7.3-8 shows an insulated 
cell at 49 °C being readied for testing.  
Aluminum block 
Hose clamp 
FiberFrax felt 
Patch heater 
TC location 
on cell 
(under felt) 
TC location 
on hose clamp 
 
Temperature probe 
for positive terminal 
Temperature sense 
for anchor wire 
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Figure 7.3-8. Cell on a 49 °C Hotplate Being Prepared for Testing 
Table 7.3-2 shows the key thermal events for the major cell constituent materials in the 
Duracell® Ultra® CR123. These data can lend insight into the temperatures at which individual 
cell components began to breakdown. 
Table 7.3-2. Key Thermal Events for Major Cell Constituent Materials 
Temperature 
(°C) 
Event 
85 Boiling point of 1,2 dimethoxyethane 
135 Melting point of polypropylene 
180 Melting point of Li 
236 Melting point of lithium perchlorate 
242 Boiling point of propylene carbonate 
243 Boiling point of ethylene carbonate 
300 Decomposition of carbon black 
423 Melting point of lithium trifluoromethane sulfonate 
535 Decomposition of manganese dioxide 
7.3.4 Single-Cell Heater Trigger-Cell Test Results 
The general sequence of events associated with a typical single-cell heater trigger test is shown 
in Figure 7.3-9. The corresponding trigger-cell temperature response during test is shown in 
Figure 7.3-10. Time shown in video are not synchronized with data acquisition time stamp. 
These data and images are for Cell ID#044, which had a patch heater with a  
15-W power level attached to its side. Cell temperature corresponds to the cell jacket 
temperature.  
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Figure 7.3-9. Representative cell Response to Trigger-cell Testing Leading to TR Event  
(Cell ID#044) 
 
Figure 7.3-10. Temperature Response in Trigger Cell at Ambient Temperature with 15-W Heater 
The cell temperature was 26 C at the test start. At 5:25 minutes after the heater was turned on, 
the cell vented with electrolyte and smoke. The measured cell temperature at this point was 
131 C. Note the cell core temperature could be at least 10 C hotter than the jacket temperature 
at the thermocouple location [32]. At 10:65 minutes and 174 C, the cell ejected molten Li. The 
TR event occurred at 10:48 minutes and >550 C. Immediately following the TR event , ejecta 
was accompanied by flames, and the cell temperature had risen to over 700 C. Flames were 
visible for approximately 1 minute after the TR event. The cell case remained intact with no 
internal components being ejected. 
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Based on experience from prior NESC Li cell TR studies [33], the assessment team deduced the 
time to achieve TR in this case was too long and would likely cause adjacent cell heating prior to 
a trigger-cell TR event in a bundle level test. Hence, the target time for a single cell to achieve 
TR was established at between 2 and 3 minutes. The single-cell trials were continued at varying 
power levels to attempt to achieve TR within the target time. Heater powers of 20 and 30 W 
were initially chosen for battery level tests. Based on those test results (see Section 7.4), a 35-W 
heater was used.  
Data for several representative tests are given in Figures 7.3-11 through 7.3-15.  
 
Figure 7.3-11. Temperature Response in Trigger Cell at Ambient Temperature with 20-W Heater 
 
Figure 7.3-12. Temperature Response in Trigger Cell at Ambient Temperature with 25-W Heater 
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Figure 7.3-13. Temperature Response in Trigger Cell at 49 °C with 25-W Heater 
 
Figure 7.3-14. Temperature Response in Trigger Cell at Ambient Temperature with 35-W Heater 
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Figure 7.3-15. Temperature Response in Trigger Cell at Ambient Temperature with 40-W Heater 
The effect of heater power and location and cell starting temperature (i.e., ambient versus 49 C) 
on TR temperature for the single cell heater trigger tests is shown in Figure 7.3-16. The results 
indicate the TR temperature was not affected by cell starting temperature variations. The effect 
of heater power on the maximum cell jacket temperature and time to TR is shown in Figure  
7.3-17. These results indicate that as heater power is decreased, the time to TR increases. In 
addition, the maximum cell jacket temperature does not vary significantly with heater power.  
 
Figure 7.3-16. Effect of Heater Power, Heater Location, and Starting Temperature on TR 
Temperature for the Single Cell Heater Trigger Tests 
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Figure 7.3-17. Effect of Heater Power on the Maximum Cell Jacket Temperature and Time to TR 
7.3.5 Summary and Findings 
Single cell heater trigger-cell testing was conducted on SAFER battery cells to determine the 
optimal heater power setting and heater location to initiate TR. Ultimately, 35 W was determined 
to be the ideal heater power to initiate a TR event within the SAFER battery design. (See Section 
8.1, F-4 through F-6.) 
7.4 Battery TR Testing 
7.4.1 Objectives 
The objective of this testing was to quantify severity and evaluate the extent of cell-to-cell TR 
propagation from a single-cell TR event. The approach was to: 
 Conduct worst-case testing with flight-like SAFER battery test article and interfaces. 
 Conduct tests at ambient temperature and pressure. 
 Utilize results from single-cell heater trigger testing. 
 Avoid over-test (false-positive case) condition(s). 
7.4.2 Experimental 
Trigger-cell location within the SAFER battery was analyzed by considering the SAFER battery 
cell packaging design and previous lessons learned from NESC-sponsored EMU Li-Ion battery 
testing [33]. Based on the results of this analysis, five candidate trigger-cell locations were 
identified to best support worst-case battery-level TR testing (Figure 7.4-1). 
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Figure 7.4-1. Trigger-cell Locations for Battery-level Over-temperature Testing 
Selection of trigger-cell locations which represented the worst-case for thermal heat transfer 
within the battery design was based on the following rationale: 
1. Trigger cells are placed in both 4S and 10S sides of battery 
2. Trigger cell(s) with fewest adjacent cells (i.e., Positions #1, #2, #3, and #4). 
 From previous NASA studies, it was determined that trigger-cell locations with fewer 
adjacent cell(s) reduce likelihood of thermal biasing (over-test) test condition [34]. 
3. Positions #3 and #4 are nearest to gauge board. 
4. Trigger-cell Position #5 location is closest to SAFER flight heritage temperature sensor 
location  
Based on these analyses, trigger cells were located in Position #1 for Battery TR Tests #1, #2 and 
#3. The trigger cell was located in Position #2 for Battery TR Test #4. The battery pack volume 
containing the gauge board and wiring is 8.97 cm long × 6.35 cm wide × 4.97 cm deep, with a 
0.23-cm wall thickness. Therefore, the spacing between the 4S and 10S bundles is 8.97 cm, 
which is critical in analyzing bundle-to-bundle propagation. 
The second decision regarding the test configuration was the trigger-cell heating method to 
produce TR conditions. This topic is discussed in Section 7.3. The heater levels chosen were: 20 
W for Test #1, 30 W for Test #2, and 35 W for Tests #3 and #4. 
To best simulate the relevant SAFER battery flight unit configuration and environment, battery-
level heater trigger testing with a SAFER unit mass simulator was conducted. The test articles 
were assembled in a ‘flight-like’ configuration.  
Figures 7.4-2 and 7.4-3 show cell assembly and bundling, the SAFER flight unit battery pack 
assembly on the left, and the test articles on the right. Every effort was made to simulate the 
flight hardware configuration. However, as indicated the environment was ambient temperature 
and pressure. 
Battery Capacity 
Gauge Board
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a) Flight configuration.                                       b) Flight-like configuration. 
Figure 7.4-2. Cell Assembly and Bundling in Flight Unit (left) and Test Unit (right) 
 
a) Flight configuration.                                  b) Flight-like configuration. 
Figure 7.4-3. Assembly of Battery Packs, Flight Unit (left) and Test Unit (right) 
During Tests #1 and #2 post-test battery cell effluent combustion and ejecta were observed. It 
was assessed the combustion contributed to a non-flight-like situation that constituted an over-
test. Therefore, it was determined that an interface plate was necessary to avoid post-test 
combustion. A flight-like SAFER mass simulator interface was designed and added to the battery 
pack for Tests #3 and #4 that restricted the access of ambient air (i.e., oxygen source) to the test 
article. Keeping in mind the SAFER battery is also stowed in the pressurized volume and hence 
testing at worst case in air was performed. Figure 7.4-4 shows the flight-like SAFER mass 
simulator interface compared to the SAFER flight interface. 
SAFER Battery
Flight Configuration
SAFER Test Battery
Flight-Like Configuration
SAFER Battery
Flight Configuration
SAFER Test Battery
Flight-Like Configuration
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Figure 7.4-4. SAFER Flight Unit (left), and Test Unit (right), with the Mass Simulator Interface 
Table 7.4-1 shows the test type and condition for the battery-level trigger-cell over-temperature 
testing. For each test run, the trigger cell was heated to initiate TR while the battery was 
contained within its housing in the flight configuration. The heater power, trigger-cell locations, 
and test temperature selection are indicated. 
Table 7.4-1. 14S-3P Battery-level TR Trigger-cell Over-temperature Characterization Test Matrix 
Test # 
Trigger-
cell 
Location 
Heater 
Power 
(W)* 
Heater 
Location* 
Temperature* 
Interface 
Plate 
Estimated 
Test Duration 
(hour) 
No. of 
Test 
Articles 
Status 
1 1 20 Side Ambient No 1 1 
Completed 
6/18/15 
2 1 30 Side Ambient No 1 1 
Completed 
7/1/15 
3 1 35 Side Ambient Yes 1 1 
Completed 
4/27/16 
4 2 35 Side Ambient Yes 1 1 
Completed 
5/25/16 
* Recommendations based on the results of the single-cell over-temperature trigger heater testing.  
Originally, eight tests were planned. However, after conducting the first four tests of which Tests 
#3 and #4 were of greatest value, the assessment objectives were met and testing was terminated. 
Unless otherwise specified, temperature sensors were placed in the same locations on the cells 
and within the battery as they are placed for external short-circuit testing. In addition to 
recording heater voltage and current, the temperature of the environment in close proximity to 
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the test article was monitored and recorded. Video monitoring was recorded for all trigger-cell 
over-temperature testing. 
7.4.3 Discussion of Results 
Four SAFER battery-level TR tests were performed between June 2015 and May 2016. These 
tests will be summarized in the order performed. 
Test #1 – 20-W heater on cell in Position #1 
Figure 7.4-5 shows trigger-cell and thermocouple locations for Test #1, which utilized a patch 
heater on the designated trigger cell. 
 
Figure 7.4-5. Test #1 Trigger-cell and Thermocouple Locations 
Cells were bundled and the battery pack was assembled in a flight-like configuration. Assembly 
images are shown in Figure 7.4-6. Note there was a relatively large opening over the gauge board 
that served as feed-through for the voltage sense lines and thermocouple outputs. 
  
Figure 7.4-6. Test #1 Assembly 
Trigger-cell temperature and voltage readings for Test #1 are shown in Figure 7.4-7. The heater 
power was applied at about 2 minutes, and trigger-cell TR occurred at about 13 minutes, at 
which time the heater power was turned off. Trigger-cell maximum temperature was 
approximately 850 C. Voltage drop of the 4S1 bundle occurs at about 7 minutes, indicating the 
cell had vented. Voltage drop of the 10S bundle side occurs at approximately 13 minutes, 
indicating that an external shorting path had occurred, leading to electrical discharge of the 10S 
bundle side cells. 
Test 1.
Assembly
Pictures.
Test 1.
Assembly
Pi tures.
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Thermocouple temperature data from Test #1 is given in Figure 7.4-8. Note that, except for the 
“free air” and housing temperatures, the maximum temperatures for most thermocouples was in 
excess of 800 °C. There is some noise in the thermocouple measurements, which causes spikes 
in temperature values in excess of 1000 °C. However, it is very unlikely the actual temperatures 
reached this high level. 
 
Figure 7.4-7. Trigger-cell Temperature and Voltage Readings for Test #1 (Voltage (V), 
Current(Amps), Power (W) on the left, and Temp (C) on right 
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Figure 7.4-8. Thermocouple temperature plots for Test 1. 
Test video shows the TR propagation from the trigger cell to the battery pack with substantial 
fire from the feed-through opening above the gauge board connector. Vented electrolyte vapors 
(e.g., 1,2-dimethoxy ethane and ethylene carbonate) are flammable, which contributed to the fire 
intensity. The fire burned almost continuously until the last 4S bundle side cell TR occurred. 
The post-test images and destructive physical analysis (DPA) (Appendix F) show that complete 
cell-to-cell propagation occurred in the 4S bundle side, and all 12 cells were consumed. Most 
cells on 4S bundle side had can breach. However, images show (Figure 7.4-9) that all cells on the 
10S bundle side were only slightly damaged, and did not enter TR.  
 
Figure 7.4-9. Test #1 Post-test Images of Exemplar Cells from 4S Bundle Side (left) and from 10S 
Bundle Side (right) 
Test 1  DPA Photos
Example of cells from 4S Bundle (left) and 10S Bundle (right) 
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The gauge board was melted and burned during the test. However, the space occupied by the 
gauge board and associated wiring was sufficient to provide thermal isolation to protect the 10S 
bundle side. Additionally, due to circulating current paths created in the 4S bundle side failure, 
external short-circuit condition was likely seen by 10S bundle side cells. The DPA notes in 
Appendix F show the 10S bundle side voltages of approximately 5V, which is approximately 
2.5 V/cell down from a nominal 3-V/cell for a fresh cell. Therefore, the cell electrical discharge 
made them less susceptible to TR. 
The following is a Test #1 summary of major events: 
1. Position #1 trigger cell experienced TR with venting, smoke, and fire, which was not 
contained in the battery pack. 
2. TR propagated to all 12 4S bundle side cells.  
3. Battery case temperatures exceeded 800 °C.  
4. Capacity gauge board was destroyed during TR event.  
5. No 10S bundle side cells experienced TR. Possible contributors are:  
a. Physical separation of the 10S bundle side from the 4S bundle side. 
i. The capacity gauge board cavity spacing restricts heat transfer to 10S 
bundle side. 
b. The 4S bundle side cell TR created an electrical short circuit path that depleted 
the 10S bundle side cell charge.  
6. Test #1 was considered invalid due to the time required to initiate trigger-cell TR 
(approximately 9 minutes), and the resulting fire magnitude and duration. 
Test #2 – 30-W heater on cell in Position #1 
Figure 7.4-10 shows trigger-cell and thermocouple locations for Test #2, which utilized a patch 
heater on the designated trigger cell. 
 
Figure 7.4-10. Trigger-cell and Thermocouple Locations for Test #2. 
Assembly images are shown in Figure 7.4-11. Note the battery pack assembly and the opening 
for voltage sense lines and thermocouple feed-through above the gauge board connector were 
similar to Test #1. 
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Trigger-cell temperature and voltage readings for Test #2 are shown in Figure 7.4-12. The heater 
power was applied, and trigger-cell TR occurred at about 4 minutes, at which time the heater 
power was turned off.  
The higher wattage heater (i.e., 30 W versus 25 W in Test #1) caused the trigger-cell TR at a 
shorter time. Trigger-cell maximum temperature was approximately 400 °C. The 4S1 bundle 
voltage drop occurred at about 4 minutes, indicating the trigger cell had vented. The 14S1 bundle 
voltage drops at this time, but the 10S1-cell voltage remains constant until about 10 minutes 
elapsed time. 
  
Figure 7.4-11. Test #2 Assembly 
4S2 bundle voltage drop occurred at approximately 6.5 minutes, indicating that TR effects. The 
14S2 voltage drops proportionally at this time, but the 10S2-cell voltage remains constant until 
about 10 minutes. 
4S3 bundle voltage drop occurred at approximately 8 minutes, indicating that TR effects. The 
14S3 voltage drops proportionally at this time, but the 10S3-cell voltage remains until about 
12 minutes. 
These voltage measurements are indicators of 4S bundle TR propagation. The cell-to-cell TR 
propagation was slower in Test #2 than Test #1. This indicates the more rapid trigger-cell heating 
allowed less heating of adjacent cells, which did not predispose the adjacent cells to early TR. 
Test 2.
Assembly
Pictures.
Test 2.
Assembly
Pictures.
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Figure 7.4-12. Test #2 Trigger-cell Temperature and Voltage Readings 
Thermocouple temperatures are shown in Figure 7.4-13. Note that cell TR propagation occurred 
over an 11-minute interval, from approximately minute 4 to approximately minute 15 elapsed 
time. 
 
Figure 7.4-13. Test #2 Thermocouple Temperature Plots 
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The post-test images and DPA show that cell-to-cell TR propagation occurred in the 4S bundle 
side, and all 12 cells were consumed. As in Test #1, the open feed-through allowed cell vapors 
and ejecta to escape the battery pack, which caused a sustained fire. The fire intensified after TR 
propagation to the adjacent cells and burned almost continuously until the last 4S bundle side 
cell TR occurred. The gauge board was melted and burned during the test. 
Most 4S bundle side cells had a can breach (Appendix F). However, images show the 10S bundle 
cells (Figure 7.4-14) were only slightly damaged, and did not enter TR. 
 
a) Close up of 4S bundle cavity and demarcation line between 4S bundle and 10S bundle. 
 
b) Removal of 10S bundle. 
Figure 7.4-14. Test #2 Post-test Images 
The 10S bundle side voltage (Appendix F) was higher than in Test #1. Voltages for the 10S1, 
10S2, and 10S3 bundles were 12.6, 8.7, and 8.3 V, respectively. These cells are highly 
discharged, which made them less susceptible to TR. 
The following is a Test #2 summary of major events: 
1. Position #1 trigger cell experienced TR with venting, smoke, and fire, which was not 
contained in the battery pack. 
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2. TR propagated to all 12 4S bundle side cells.  
a. The heater duration was slightly over 4 minutes. 
b. Propagation from cell-to-cell was slower, since the trigger-cell heater wattage was 
higher. 
3. Battery case temperatures exceeded 800 °C.  
4. Capacity gauge board was destroyed during TR event.  
5. No 10S bundle side cells experienced TR. Possible contributors are:  
a. Physical separation of the 10S bundle side from the 4S bundle side. 
i. The capacity gauge board cavity spacing restricts heat transfer to 10S 
bundle side. 
b. The 4S bundle side cell TR created an electrical short circuit path that depleted 
the 10S bundle side cell charge.  
6. Test #2 was considered invalid due to resulting fire magnitude and duration. 
Test #3 – 35-W heater on cell in Position #1 
Figure 7.4-15 shows trigger-cell and thermocouple locations for Test #3, which utilized a 
ceramic heater on the designated trigger cell. 
 
Figure 7.4-15. Test #3 Trigger-cell and Thermocouple Locations 
Cells were bundled and the battery pack was assembled in a flight-like configuration. Assembly 
images are shown in Figure 7.4-16. Note the SAFER mass simulator interface was installed on 
the battery pack that served as feed-through for the voltage sense lines and thermocouple 
outputs. 
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Figure 7.4-16. Test #3 Assembly 
Trigger-cell temperature and voltage readings for Test #3 are shown in Figure 7.4-17. The heater 
power was applied at the start of the timer, and full TR of the trigger cell occurred at about 3 
minutes, at which time the heater power was turned off.  
The higher-wattage heater (i.e., 35 W compared to 25 W in Test #1) caused the trigger-cell TR at 
significantly shorter time. This may be due to the change in patch heater design (i.e., ceramic 
versus patch) and applied wattage. The trigger-cell maximum temperature was over 700 °C. The 
4S1 bundle side voltage decrease occurred at slightly under 2 minutes in elapsed time, indicating 
the trigger cell had vented. TR occurred at 3 minutes, at which time heater power declined 
significantly. Heater power was turned off at 4 minutes (see Figure 7.4-17). The 4S1 bundle side 
voltage drops to zero at approximately 3 minutes. The 14S1 string voltage drops proportionally 
at this time, but the 10S1 bundle side voltage fluctuated for the next 80 seconds. The 10S1 
bundle side voltage remained steady until about 5.8 minutes, when it dropped to zero volts.  
The 4S2 bundle side voltage drop occurred at approximately 4 minutes, indicating that TR had 
affected those cells. The 4S2 bundle side voltage reaches zero volts at approximately 
4.5 minutes. The 14S2 string voltage dropped proportionally at this time. The 10S2 bundle side 
voltage remained steady until about 5.5 minutes, when is dropped to zero volts. 
The 4S3 bundle side voltage drop occurred at approximately 4.5 minutes, indicating that TR had 
affected those cells. Interestingly, one cell in the 4S3 bundle survived and provided nearly 3 V 
until approximately 5.2 minutes. The 14S3 string voltage dropped proportionally at this time. 
Test 3
Assembly
Pictures.
Note the 
presence of the 
SAFER mass 
simulator 
interface with 
electrical feed-
thru (lower 
picture).
  
 
NESC Document #: NESC-RP-14-00963 Page #: 68 of 141 
The 10S bundle side voltage remained until about 5.8 minutes, at which time it dropped to zero 
volts. 
These voltage measurements are indicators of TR propagation through the battery pack 4S 
bundle. The propagation from cell-to-cell was slower in Test #3 than Test #1. This indicates the 
more rapid trigger-cell heating caused less heating of adjacent cells, and did not predispose the 
adjacent cells to early TR.  
 
Figure 7.4-17. Test #3 Trigger-cell Temperature and Voltage Readings 
Thermocouple temperatures and heater power are shown in Figure 7.4-18. Trigger-cell TR 
occurred at approximately 3 minutes, at which time the heater power was reduced. It appears 
there may have been some shorting of the power leads, as the power fluctuated between 
3 minutes and slightly over 4 minutes, when the heater power was turned off. Additional heater 
power detail is shown in Figure 7.4-19.  
Note the 4S bundle side TR propagation occurred over a shorter time interval  
(i.e., approximately 3 minutes). 
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Figure 7.4-18. Test #3 Thermocouple Temperatures and Heater Power 
 
Note: TC11 and TC12 are adjacent to the trigger cell. The trigger-cell temperature not shown. 
Figure 7.4-19. Detail of Heater Power, with Thermocouple Temperatures 
The post-test images in Figure 7.4-20 and DPA notes show that cell-to-cell TR propagation 
occurred in the 4S bundle side, and all 12 cells were consumed. TR did not occur in any cells in 
the 10S bundle side. However, unlike Tests #1 and #2, there was no sustained fire since the 
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external feed-through was sealed, and cell vapors and ejecta could not easily escape the battery 
pack. Small flames intermittently were seen, but the ‘secondary fire’ was negligible. The gauge 
board was melted and burned during the test. 
Most 4S bundle side cells had can breaches (Appendix F). However, images show that all 10S 
bundle side cells were slightly damaged, and did not enter TR.  
 
a) 4S bundle side.                                                    b) 10S bundle side. 
Figure 7.4-20. Test #3 Post-test Images 
10S bundle side voltages (Appendix F) were significantly higher than in Tests #1 or #2. 10A, 
10B, and 10C bundle side voltages were 30.2, 27.2 and 27.1 V, respectively. These cells were at 
a high state of charge, with 10A bundle at near full charge. This was unexpected since the 10S 
bundle side voltage readings during the test were measured at zero volts after 5.8 minutes. The 
10S bundle side voltage drop shown in Figure 7.4-17 could be caused by open-circuit electrical 
failure during the TR propagation. 
The following is a Test #3 summary of major events: 
1. Position #1 trigger cell in Position 1 experiences TR with venting, smoke, and fire, which 
were largely contained in the battery pack. 
a. The reduced amount of fire compared to Test #1 & #2 was likely due to the 
addition of flight-like SAFER unit mass simulator. 
b. No sustained fire was observed since the feed-through was sealed, and cell vapors 
and ejecta could not easily escape the battery pack. 
2. TR propagated to all 12 4S bundle side cells.  
a. The heater power application duration was slightly over 4 minutes. 
b. TR propagation from cell-to-cell occurred over a period of approximately 
3 minutes. 
3. Battery case temperatures exceeded 800 °C.  
4. Capacity gauge board was destroyed during TR event.  
5. No 10S bundle side cells experienced TR. Possible contributors were: 
a. Physical separation of the 10S bundle side from the 4S bundle side. 
i. Capacity gauge board cavity spacing restricts heat transfer to 10S bundle 
side. 
6. This test was considered acceptable. 
Test 3 DPA
Photo of 4S bundle side (left) and 10S bundle side (right).
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Test #4 – 35-W heater on cell in Position #2 
Figure 7.4-21 shows trigger-cell and thermocouple locations for Test #4, which utilized a 
ceramic heater on the designated trigger cell. 
 
Figure 7.4-21. Test #4 trigger-cell and Thermocouple Locations 
Cells were bundled and the battery pack was assembled in a flight-like configuration. Assembly 
images are shown in Figure 7.4-22. Note that a SAFER mass simulator interface was installed on 
the battery pack that served as feed-through for the voltage sense lines and thermocouple 
outputs. The feed-through assembly is essentially the same as seen in Test #3 (Figure 7.4-16). 
    
a) 4S bundle side.                                                  b) 10S bundle side. 
Figure 7.4-22. Test #4 Assembly 
Trigger-cell temperature and voltage readings for Test #4 are shown in Figure 7.4-23. 10C 
bundle side voltage decreased at about 2.5 minutes, indicating trigger cell venting. The 10C 
bundle voltage dropped to zero volts at slightly over 4 minutes, at which time the heater power 
was turned off.  
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Figure 7.4-23. Test #4 Heater Power and Voltage Readings 
The 10B bundle side voltage showed instability at about 6 minutes, indicating TR had progressed 
to that bundle. The voltage of this bundle dropped to zero volts at slightly over 7 minutes elapsed 
time. The 10C bundle side voltage showed instability at about 8.5 minutes, indicating TR had 
progressed to that bundle. The voltage of this bundle dropped to zero volts at slightly less than 
10 minutes elapsed time. These voltage measurements are indicators of TR propagation through 
the 10S bundle side of the battery pack.  
Plot of heater power and thermocouple temperatures is shown in Figure 7.4-24. Because of the 
large number of thermocouples, the plot is difficult to comprehend. Figure 7.4-25 is provided as 
a simplified view of the heater power and external thermocouple temperature data. 
The first TR occurred at slightly over 4 minutes elapsed time. The last TR occurred at slightly 
under 12 minutes elapsed time. This longer interval (i.e., approximately 8 minutes) reflects the 
large number of cells (i.e., 30) that entered TR. 
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Figure 7.4-24. Test #4 Thermocouple Temperature Plots 
 
Figure 7.4-25. Test #4 External Thermocouple Temperature Plots 
The data in Figure 7.4-25 show: 
 Thermocouples (TCs) 18 and 19 are near the trigger cell and respond when it enters TR at 
approximately 6 minutes.  
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 TCs 20, 21, and 22 are on the battery case exterior surface reach the highest temperatures 
of approximately 220 to 255 °C. 
 All other TCs on the 10-cell side of battery pack had peak temperatures at no greater than 
approximately 180 °C. 
 TCs 23 and 24 on the 4-cell side of battery pack had peak temperatures of approximately 
130 to 140 °C. 
 TC 27 (i.e., air measurement) responded to an external fire at about 6 minutes and then 
returned to ambient temperature readings. 
The battery pack case temperature profile was monitored using an infrared (IR) camera. Figure 
7.4-26 shows screen shots of the IR camera output at various test times.  
 
Figure 7.4-26. Test 4 IR Images at Various Times during SAFER Battery-level TR 
The Table 7.4-2 gives the time and temperature data for the inset images in Figure 7.4-26. Note 
the IR temperature readout records the highest temperature sensed in the IR image frame. 
Temperatures in C and F images are higher than temperatures in subsequent images because the 
IR camera was recording the flame temperature. 
These data show the progressive battery pack case external surface heating during 10S bundle 
side TR propagation. Note there is an induction period of about 1 minute before the case 
temperature exceeds 170 °C. This is in general agreement with the thermocouple temperatures 
A
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displayed in Figure 7.4-25. The maximum IR temperature data was 268.7 °C. This is also in 
general agreement with the thermocouple data, which had the highest temperatures of 
approximately 220 to 255 °C. 
Table 7.4-2. Time and Temperature Data for the Figure 7.4-26 Inset Images 
 
The post-test images and DPA show that cell-to-cell propagation occurred in the 10S bundle 
side, with all 30 cells being consumed. TR did not occur in any cells in the 4S bundle side. 
Unlike Tests #1 and #2, there was no sustained fire since the feed-through was sealed, and cell 
vapors and ejecta could not easily escape the battery pack. Small flames were intermittently 
observed, but the ‘secondary fire’ was negligible. The gauge board was melted and burned 
during the test. 
Most 10S bundle side cells had can breaches (Appendix F). However, the images show all the 4S 
bundle side cells were only slightly damaged, and did not enter TR. See Figure 7.4-27. 
 
Figure 7.4-27. Test #4 Post-test Image of Open Battery Pack 
Image in 
Figure      
7.5-26  
IR Image Title
Time 
(mm:ss)
Elapsed Time 
(mm:ss)
Temperature  
(°C)
A Heater On 04:03.0 00:00.0 38.0
B Pre TR Onset 04:16.8 00:13.8 38.0
C Post TR Onset 04:17.8 00:14.9 119.2
D Heater Off 04:29.5 00:26.5 59.4
E Pre Propagation 05:19.4 01:16.4 56.3
F Post Propagation #1 05:20.4 01:17.5 274.8
G Post Propagation #2 05:47.0 01:44.1 177.8
H Post Propagation #3 06:22.3 02:19.4 178.6
I Post Propagation #4 07:23.3 03:20.3 203.7
J Post Propagation #5 08:23.0 04:20.0 208.8
K Post Propagation #6 09:22.9 05:20.0 256.2
L Post Propagation #7 10:22.8 06:19.8 268.7
Test 4.  DPA Photo of 
opened battery pack.
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Voltage of the 4S bundle side (Appendix F) show that external shorting occurred, reducing state 
of charge. Voltages for Bundles 4S1 , 4S2 and 4S3 were 3.2, 1.2, and 5.7 V, respectively. Initial 
voltages were 12.3 to 12.6 V. These cells are highly discharged, which makes them less 
susceptible to TR. 
The following is a Test #4 summary of major events: 
1. Position #2 trigger experienced TR with venting, smoke and fire, but they were largely 
contained in the battery pack. 
a. The reduced amount of fire as compared to Tests #1 and #2 was likely due to 
addition of flight-like SAFER unit mass simulator. 
b. No sustained fire was observed since the feed-through was sealed, and cell vapors 
and ejecta could not easily escape the battery pack. 
2. TR propagated to all 30 10S bundle side cells.  
a. The heater duration was slightly over 4 minutes. 
i. The longer heater time could be due to the different trigger-cell location 
compared to Tests #1, #2, and #3. 
b. Propagation from cell-to-cell occurred over a period of approximately 8 minutes. 
i. Many more cells were involved in TR, compared to 4S bundle side. 
3. Battery case temperatures exceeded 800 °C.  
4. Capacity gauge board was destroyed during TR event.  
5. No 4S bundle side cells experienced TR. Possible contributors were:  
a. Physical separation of the 10S bundle side from the 4S bundle side. 
i. Capacity gauge board cavity spacing restricts heat transfer to 4S bundle 
side. 
b. The 10S bundle side cell TR created an electrical short circuit path that depleted 
the 4S bundle side cell charge.  
6. This test was considered acceptable. 
7.4.4 Summary and Findings 
See Section 8.1, F-7 through F-10. 
8.0 Findings, Observations, and NESC Recommendations 
8.1 Findings 
The following findings were identified: 
F-1. The SAFER battery hazard report does not identify single-cell TR propagation as a 
hazard. 
F-2. Flight-similar OCV and CCV cell acceptance testing resulted in a significant number of 
out-of-specification test cells. 
F-3. SAFER flight battery build procedures do not include a process step for cell matching 
and selection. 
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F-4. Results from the single-cell heater trigger varied with heater power level and type (i.e., 
patch versus ceramic).  
- At constant heater power levels, cell TR onset temperature and maximum cell 
temperatures varied. 
- At increasing heater power levels, cell TR onset time decreases. 
F-5. Cell TR onset temperature and maximum cell temperature were independent of 49 C 
hot-case test conditions and heater location. 
F-6. Parametric single-cell heater trigger TR testing was successful in determining worst-case 
heater power to induce cell-level catastrophic TR condition. 
- Single-cell heater trigger testing at 10 W did not result in a catastrophic TR condition. 
- Single-cell heater trigger testing between 15 and 40 W resulted in catastrophic TR 
conditions. 
- 35 W is maximum heater power that Duracell® Ultra® CR123 cell can endure without 
cell rupture. 
F-7. Under ambient conditions, a single-cell TR in the 4S bundle side results in cell-to-cell TR 
propagation to all 12 cells in that bundle (i.e., Tests #1, #2, and #3). 
F-8. Under ambient conditions, a single-cell TR in the 10S bundle side results in cell-to-cell 
TR propagation to all 30 cells in that bundle (Test #4). 
F-9. SAFER battery capacity gauge board cavity provides sufficient spacing of approximately 
3.5 inches between the 4S-cell and 10S-cell bundles to prevent propagation of TR to the 
opposite side of battery pack. 
F-10. Ambient oxygen sources (such as air) increases severity of SAFER battery TR 
consequences. 
8.2 Observations 
 Results from the 4S- and 10S-cell bundle external short tests indicate that the external 
bundle PTC thermal fuse operated nominally under the test conditions employed. 
 Results from the 4S- and 10S-cell bundle external short tests were consistent with 
previous JSC ESTA SAFER battery external short test results.  
 External short testing of 4S- and 10S-cell SAFER battery bundles without an external 
PTC device did not result in a TR condition. 
- Cell-level PTC thermal fuses provided adequate TR fault protection.  
 External short testing of 4S- and 10S-cell SAFER battery bundles with external and cell-
level PTC devices did not result in a TR condition. 
 Time to cell TR onset temperature decreases with increasing heater power. 
 Cell TR onset and maximum cell TR temperatures were independent of heater location 
(bottom versus side). 
 Cell TR onset temperatures occurred near the melting point (180oC) of lithium metal. 
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8.3 NESC Recommendations 
The following NESC recommendations were identified and directed towards the ISS EVA 
Program Office, JSC Propulsion and Power Division, and the NESC Electrical Power TDT:  
ISS EVA Program Office 
 Develop a SAFER battery design which mitigates the hazardous effects of cell-to-cell TR 
propagation which may result in venting, electrolyte leakage, ignition of gas-phase 
flammable gases, fire, smoke, and/or ejecta. (F-7 through F-10). 
 Conduct worst-case systems engineering analysis to quantify the effects of SAFER 
battery TR on the SAFER unit function and operation. (F-7 through F-10). 
 Update the SAFER flight battery hazards report to include TR propagation as a hazard 
condition. (F-1). 
NESC Electrical Power TDT 
 (a.) Develop acceptable test methods to induce TR that most reliably simulates Li cell 
and battery level causes for TR hazards. (b.) Encourage the adoption of these new test 
methods into an Agency standard to support current and future NASA Li battery 
applications. (F-4 through F-6). 
JSC Propulsion and Power Division 
 Conduct a detailed SAFER battery procurement and acceptance test process and 
procedures review. The review should include, but not be limited to, an evaluation of the 
CCV test screening methodology, procedure, and pass/fail criteria. (F-2). 
 Include cell matching as part of selecting flight cells for SAFER flight battery 
manufacturing. (F-3). 
9.0 Alternate Viewpoint 
There were no alternate viewpoints identified during the course of this assessment by the NESC 
team or the NRB quorum. 
10.0 Other Deliverables 
No unique hardware, software, or data packages, outside those contained in this report, were 
disseminated to other parties outside this assessment. 
11.0 Lessons Learned 
No applicable lessons learned were identified for entry into the NASA Lessons Learned 
Information System (LLIS) as a result of this assessment. 
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12.0 Recommendations for NASA Standards and Specifications 
As per R-4, it is recommended that the NESC Electrical Power TDT use the results from this 
study to develop acceptable test methods to induce TR that most reliably simulates Li cell and 
battery level causes for TR hazards. These new test methods should be adopted into a subsequent 
revision JSC20793 Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements to support current and 
future NASA Li battery applications. 
13.0 Definition of Terms 
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
Finding A relevant factual conclusion and/or issue that is within the assessment 
scope and that the team has rigorously based on data from their 
independent analyses, tests, inspections, and/or reviews of technical 
documentation. 
Lessons Learned Knowledge, understanding, or conclusive insight gained by experience 
that may benefit other current or future NASA programs and projects. The 
experience may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, 
as in a mishap or failure. 
Observation A noteworthy fact, issue, and/or risk, which may not be directly within the 
assessment scope, but could generate a separate issue or concern if not 
addressed. Alternatively, an observation can be a positive 
acknowledgement of a Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational 
structure, tools, and/or support provided. 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment. 
Proximate Cause  The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its 
occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. 
Recommendation A proposed measurable stakeholder action directly supported by specific 
Finding(s) and/or Observation(s) that will correct or mitigate an identified 
issue or risk. 
Root Cause One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that 
contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired 
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the 
undesired outcome. Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an 
undesired outcome. 
Supporting Narrative A paragraph, or section, in an NESC final report that provides the detailed 
explanation of a succinctly worded finding or observation. For example, 
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the logical deduction that led to a finding or observation; descriptions of 
assumptions, exceptions, clarifications, and boundary conditions.  
14.0 Acronyms and Nomenclature List 
A Ampere 
AC Alternating Current 
Ah ampere hour 
CCV Closed Circuit Voltage 
CoP Community of Practice 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
DPA Destructive Physical Analysis 
ELT Emergency Transmitter Locator 
EMU Extra-vehicular Mobility Unit 
ESTA Energy Systems Test Area 
EVA Extra-vehicular Activity 
FL Lower Fourth 
FU Upper Fourth 
g Grams 
HCM Hand Controller Module 
Hz Hertz 
IC Integrated Circuit 
IR Infrared 
ISS International Space Station 
IVA Intra-vehicular Activity 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
k Kilo 
Li Lithium 
Li-Ion Lithium Ion 
Li-MnO2 Lithium-Manganese Dioxide 
LLB Long Life Battery 
LREBA Li-Ion Rechargeable EVA Battery Assembly 
mAh milliamp hour 
mm millimeter 
MTA Microchip Technology Inc. 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC NASA Engineering Safety Center 
NRB NESC Review Board 
NSCKN NASA Safety Center Knowledge Now 
OCV Open Circuit Voltage 
 Ohms 
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit 
PTC Positive Temperature Coefficient 
RCCA Root Cause and Corrective action 
s-p series-parallel 
SAFER Simplified Aid For Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue 
STS Space Transportation System 
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TC Thermocouple 
TDT Technical Discipline Team 
TR Thermal Runaway 
TRR Test Readiness Review 
USA United States of America 
V Voltage 
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Appendix A. P&G Product Safety Data Sheet 
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Appendix B. Raw Data Collected from Cell Acceptance Testing 
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Appendix C. Cell Selection Statistical Analysis (Outside Values) 
Serial Number of Outside Value Cells. (XLData/Li_MnO2/ NASA_NESC_SAFER/ 
SAFER_TestBattCellATP.xlsx/Outside Values/AL3) 
Mass (g) Diameter (mm) Length (mm) OCV (V) CCV (V) AC Impedance (ohms) 
117 199 4 2 2 4 
130 200 24 3 3 5 
217 202 57 4 4 6 
495 203 77 5 5 7 
716 204 83 6 6 9 
764 208 126 7 8 10 
779 237 147 8 9 11 
787 238 199 9 10 12 
799 399 203 10 11 17 
874 894 208 11 12 26 
  373 12 13 28 
  403 13 14 29 
  423 14 15 56 
  426 15 16 59 
  441 16 17 63 
  756 17 18 82 
  894 18 19 85 
   19 20 94 
   20 25 95 
   78 39 97 
    42 102 
    78 104 
    82 136 
    86 166 
    110 187 
    112 190 
    135 256 
    220 290 
    235 344 
    256 595 
    272 625 
    282  
    332  
    430  
    542  
    595  
    608  
    642  
    722  
    782  
    796  
    805  
    819  
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Appendix D. PolySwitch® PTC Device Specifications 
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Appendix E. NASA SAFER Battery Assessment Test Plan 
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Appendix F. DPA Notes from Tests #1, #2, #3, and #4 
DPA Notes from Test # 1 – 20W heater on trigger cell in Position 1 (6/18/15). 
 
We performed a visual inspection of the cells from battery Test # 1 and made the 
following observations: 
1. B4S1 (cell 1, trigger) – large hole and significant damage to side from mid‐cell to 
positive terminal 
2. B4S1 (cell 2) – hole on side near negative terminal 
3. B4S1 (cell 3) – pin holes on cap & on side near positive terminal 
4. B4S1 (cell 4) – hole on side near negative terminal 
5. B4S2 (cell 1) – hole through cap 
6. B4S2 (cell 2) – hole on side near negative terminal 
7. B4S2 (cell 3) – hole on side near negative terminal 
8. B4S2 (cell 4) – large hole on side near positive terminal 
9. B4S3 (cell 1) – hole on side near positive terminal 
10. B4S3 (cell 2) – hole on side near positive terminal 
11. B4S3 (cell 3) – large hole on side between mid‐cell and positive terminal 
12. B4S3 (cell 4) – hole at positive terminal crimp 
13. B10S1 (bundle 4) – no signs of stress on cells; OCV = 5.72 V 
14. B10S2 (bundle 5) – no signs of stress on cells; OCV = 5.06 V 
15. B10S3 (bundle 6) – no signs of stress on cells; OCV = 4.08 V 
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ISAFER Battery TR Test 
Battery-Level Test # 2 – 6/30/2015 
Post-test DPA – 7/9/2015 
 
Bundle/Cell 
Location * 
OCV Notes 
4S1-1 
(trigger) 
0 Sidewall breach near positive terminal (~3/8”×1/4”) 
4S1-2 0 Pinhole near positive terminal; No sidewall breach 
4S1-3 0 Top vent; No sidewall breach (~1/4” wide) 
4S1-4 0 Top vent; No sidewall breach (~1/4” wide) 
4S2-1 0 Two pinholes on positive terminal; No sidewall breach 
4S2-2 0 Sidewall breach near positive terminal (~1/16”) 
4S2-3 0 Sidewall breach near positive terminal (~1/16”) 
4S2-4 0 Sidewall breach near positive terminal (~1/16” long) and near negative 
terminal (~1/4” wide) 
4S3-1 0 Sidewall breach near middle of cell (~1/8”×1/4”) 
4S3-2 0 Sidewall breach near positive terminal (~1/16”×1/32” wide) 
4S3-3 0 Sidewall breach near positive terminal (~1/16”×1/8”) 
4S3-4 0 Sidewall breach near negative terminal (~1/2”×1/8”) 
10S1 12.64 Minor smoke stains 
10S2 8.70  
10S3 8.27  
 
* - Bundles numbered per convention in drawing below (not latest numbering convention). Cell 
numbering does not follow drawing. Cell numbering likely reflects order of inspection and not 
location within bundles. 
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ISAFER Battery TR Test 
Battery-Level Test # 3 – 4/27/2016 
Post-test DPA – 5/3/2016 
 
Bundle/Cell 
Location 
OCV Notes 
4S1-1 0 Sidewall breach near bottom 
4S1-2 0 Sidewall breach near top 
4S1-3 0 Top vent; No sidewall breach 
4S1-4 0 Top vent; No sidewall breach; Top cap slightly separated at crimp 
seal 
4S2-1 0 Sidewall breach near top 
4S2-2 0 No obvious vent holes; Cell lid slightly lifted (swollen) when 
compared to new cell 
4S2-3 0 Sidewall breach near top; Top cap separated at crimp seal 
4S2-4 0 Sidewall breach near top; Top cap separated at crimp seal 
4S3-1 0 Sidewall breach near top; Top cap slightly separated at crimp seal 
4S3-2 0 Fused to 4C3; Sidewall breach with further damage potentially 
resulting from cell separation; Top cap separated at crimp seal 
4S3-3 0 Fused to 4C2; Sidewall breach near top 
4S3-4 0 Sidewall breach near top 
10S1 30.23 Significant amount of soot on cells under the shrink wrap and 
Kapton® tape 
10S2 27.20 Less soot on cells than in bundle 10A 
10S3 27.13 Less soot on cells than in bundle 10B 
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ISAFER Battery TR Test 
Battery-Level Test # 4 – 5/24/2016 
Post-test DPA – 5/24/2016 
Bundle Pre-
Test 
OCV 
Post-
Test 
OCV 
Pre-
Test 
Mass 
Post-
Test 
Mass 
Notes 
4S1 12.34 3.21 72 69 Minimal soot under Kapton® tape and shrink 
wrap. All cells show signs of swelling at cell 
lids. Cell jackets stretched and warped at cell 
ends. 
4S2 12.52 1.15 72 71 Minimal soot under Kapton® tape and shrink 
wrap. All cells show signs of swelling at cell 
lids. Cell jackets stretched and warped at cell 
ends. 
4S3 12.58 5.65 72 71 Minimal soot under Kapton® tape and shrink 
wrap. All cells show signs of swelling at cell 
lids. Cell jackets stretched and warped at cell 
ends. 
10S1 31.27 0.0 178 137 Completely consumed. 
10S2 31.10 0.0 175 136 Completely consumed. 
10S3 31.03 0.0 175 132 Completely consumed. 
 
Cell Pre-
Test 
OCV 
Post-
Test 
OCV 
Pre-
Test 
Mass 
Post-
Test 
Mass 
Notes 
10S1-5 - - - - At least 4 smaller sidewall perforations. 
Slight separation at spin groove. 
10S1-6 - - - - No obvious signs of venting. Minimal 
separation at spin groove. 
10S1-7 - - - - Large sidewall breach. Slight separation at 
spin groove. 
10S1-8 - - - - Significant separation at spin groove. Top lid 
popped open. 
10S1-9 
(trigger) 
- - - - Top vent at header button. 
10S1-10 - - - - Sidewall breach near header just under the 
spin groove. 
10S1-11 - - - - Two sidewall breaches near cell bottom. 
10S1-12 - - - - Sidewall breach near header just under the 
spin groove. 
10S1-13 - - - - Two sidewall breaches near cell bottom. 
Slight separation at spin groove. 
10S1-14 - - - - Sidewall breach near header just under the 
spin groove. 
10S2-5 - - - - Large sidewall breach near center of can. 
Sidewall breach near cell bottom. 
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10S2-6 - - - - Large sidewall breach near header just 
under the spin groove. Some damage may have 
occurred during DPA. 
10S2-7 - - - - Fused to 10B11. No obvious signs of venting. 
Minimal separation at spin groove. 
10S2-8 - - - - Sidewall breach near header just under the 
spin groove. 
10S2-9 - - - - Top vent at header button. 
10S2-10 - - - - Sidewall breach near header just under the 
spin groove. Separation at spin groove. 
10S2-11 - - - - Fused to 10S2#7. Sidewall breach near cell 
bottom. 
10S2-12 - - - - Fused to 10S2#13. Sidewall breach (near 
header just under the spin groove) which may 
have been created or worsened during DPA. 
10S2-13 - - - - Fused to 10S2#12. Large sidewall breach 
from center to bottom of can. Sidewall breach 
near bottom of cell which may have been 
created or worsened during DPA. 
10S2-14 - - - - Large sidewall breach near header just 
under the spin groove. Sidewall breach near 
center of can. 
10S3-5 - - - - “Pinhole” sidewall breach near cell bottom. 
Crack in sidewall near cell bottom. 
10S3-6 - - - - Sidewall breach near header. 
10S3-7 - - - - Large sidewall breach from cell center to 
bottom. Sidewall breach near cell bottom. 
10S3-8 - - - - Sidewall breach near header. 
10S3-9 - - - - Sidewall breach in two spots near bottom of 
cell. 
10S3-10 - - - - “Pinhole” sidewall breach near header. 
Separation at spin groove. 
10S3-11 - - - - Fused to 10S3#12. Large sidewall breach 
near cell bottom. 
10S3-12 - - - - Fused to 10S3#11. Large sidewall breach 
near header just under the spin groove. 
Sidewall breach near center of can. 
10S3-13 - - - - Sidewall breach near cell bottom. 
10S3-14 - - - - Sidewall breach near center of can. 
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